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The authors have written this article based on a hypothetical
presented to them by the editors of the Inter-American Law
Review. In light of the recognition that Florida has become a
center for the deposit of foreign citizens' assets, estate planners
and probate courts have been faced with a wide range of legal
and choice of law issues emerging from this phenomenon. Con-
sequently, the editors have asked the authors to address the
legal issues posed by a hypothetical situation involving a for-
eign decedent and the interplay of domestic and foreign law.
I. INTRODUCTION
Foreign investors from the four corners of the globe (and of
course from Latin America) are acquiring assets in the United
States to an unprecedented extent.1 Therefore, U.S. lawyers can no
longer ignore the existence of foreign legal systems and foreign
law.2 Visitors and immigrants arriving, with or without their fami-
1. The importance of direct foreign investment in the United States, said to be well in
excess of $100 billion, has given rise to extensive literature. See Butler, Book Review, 19
INT'L LAW. 1041 (1985) (review of one recent manual, Manual of Foreign Investment in the
United States).
2. See generally J. MERRYMaNs, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITIoN (1969) (general discussion of
the historical development and principal characteristics of the civil law system prevalent in
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lies bring with them a panoply of legal relationships and marital
property regimes that often involve concepts unknown to the com-
mon law practitioner.
Once facing prosperity in the United States, many of these
aliens accumulate assets within our borders without any thought to
estate planning. Some, accustomed as they are to community prop-
erty and forced heirships, totally ignore the issue of post-mortem
distribution of their United States property. Others, discovering
with delight North American freedom of testamentary disposition
and our well-developed methods for avoiding probate, take full ad-
vantage of these devices to the detriment of their family members
to whom their home country law traditionally affords seemingly
ironclad protection.
U.S. attorneys are now faced with an increasing number of cli-
ents, often the "forced heirs" of nonresident aliens, who find that
their legitimate expectations have been shattered by their dece-
dent's unexpected disposition of estates they thought inviolable.
Transnational divorces and separations also complicate the situa-
tion in many cases. For heirs that find themselves pretermitted for
whatever reason, the attorneys they hire in the United States be-
come important figures. In order to serve such clients properly, the
U.S. attorney increasingly is obliged to develop an expertise, not
only in the inheritance law of foreign legal systems, but also in the
conflict of laws rules of local jurisprudence regarding jurisdiction
and choice of law.
In addition to the substantive aspects of these transnational
probate cases, the attorney needs to acquire a knowledge of the
procedural devices available in the forum to insure that the client's
interests are not mooted by irreparable dissipation of assets. These
devices include such traditional mechanisms as the preliminary in-
junction and discovery. They also include the more exotic aspects
of the enforcement of foreign judgments.
Because of the large number of foreign investments and the
establishment of Miami as an international financial center, the
state of Florida promises to become a major arena for interna-
tional probate litigation involving Latin America. This article
raises some of the salient issues confronting the practitioner in this
field. The problems discussed center on a composite hypothetical
that is intended to facilitate comprehension of the often complex
the non-English-speaking countries of Latin America).
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conundrums prevalent in this area. The authors hope it will suffi-
ciently scratch the surface to encourage deeper excavation.
II. FACTUAL SITUATION
Carmen Arenz-Rodriguez de Gomez-Gonzalez is the widow of
the fabulously wealthy international entrepreneur, Carlos Gomez-
Gonzalez2 They were married in Miami in 1965, two years after
Carlos left his native Colombia and acquired resident alien status
in Miami. The couple had a long and loving marriage prior to his
death. Although Carlos had three children (two naturally born and
one adopted) by a previous marriage in Colombia to Maria Marti-
nez, it was his intention that his estate go only to Carmen and his
two children by her.4 This was so because Carlos had already
transferred many millions of dollars inter vivos to his former wife
and their three children in Colombia.
In planning his estate, Carlos had placed the bulk of the assets
he acquired after moving to Miami jointly in the names of himself
and his wife.5 As for the remaining assets that stood in his name
alone and which he had acquired before he moved to Miami, Car-
los executed a will in Florida, naming Carmen his personal repre-
sentative,6 distributing all of his worldly goods to Carmen and his
0. At the risk of belaboring what should be well known to any practitioner with clients
from the Spanish-speaking cultural sphere, may it be pointed out that such individuals
often use two last names, the first being that of the person's father, the second being that of
the mother. If Carlos Gomez Gonzalez had been born in the United States, be would give, as
his proper name, Carlos Gomez. Similarly, upon marrying, women do not change names but
indicate their status by linking their husband's last name to their own with the preposition
"de," meaning "of." Cf- M. ATWOOD, THE HANnI4nrizw's TALE (1985) (in a futuristic United
States, women are known by names such as Offred (of Fred) or Ofglen (of Glen)). Carmen
thus would give her name as Carmen Arenz de Gorez. Interestingly, U.S. courts use a hy-
phen when giving the full name of Latin American parties, e.g., Calero-Toledo, to avoid
classifying Latin Americans by their maternal patronym.
4. The first marriage in Colombia was terminated pursuant to a Colombian judicial
decree of separacin de cuerpos. See infra notes 8-9.
5. In Florida, a conveyance of real property to husband and wife, even though it does
not specify how they are to take, creates an estate by the entireties, absent expression of any
contrary intent. In re Estate of Silvian, 347 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (citing
Losey v. Losey, 221 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1969)). Both personal and real property may be held by
the spouses as tenants by the entireties. Winters v. Parks, 91 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1956). For
statutory methods by which a spouse holding title to real property may create a tenancy by
the entireties, see FLa. STAT. § 669.11(1) (1937).
6. If Carlos had died a nonresident of Florida, in his (foreign) will he could have ap-
pointed a personal representative to administer the Florida estate. FLr& STAT. § 734.102(1)
(1987). Such a personal representative would be entitled to have ancillary letters issued to
him or her on condition that he or she he qualified to act in Florida. Id. Section 733.304 of
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two children by her, and disinheriting his three Colombian
children.'
The estate was substantial since Carlos had been a rich man,
having inherited substantial sums of money from his father when
Carlos was still quite young. Part of Carlos' wealth could be attrib-
uted to good fortune. For example, a $5,000 Venezuelan gold certif-
icate, given to him as a child by his father, had steadily appreci-
ated in value and was worth over ten million dollars by the time of
his death. However, it was also through a combination of hard
work and shrewd investments, first in Colombia and later in the
United States, that Carlos had compounded his initial inheritance
many times over.
Carlos had amassed much of his fortune during his marriage
to Maria Martinez in Colombia primarily by acquiring interests in
corporations and real estate throughout Colombia and Venezuela.
However, by Colombian judicial decree, Carlos and Maria were
separated in 1960.8 In connection with their separation, Carlos,
complying with Colombian law, gave his first wife over five million
dollars representing one half of his Colombian community prop-
erty assets.'
the Florida Probate Code provides that:
[a] person who is not domiciled in the state cannot qualify as personal represen-
tative unless the person is: (1) A legally adopted child or adoptive parent of the
decedent; (2) Related by lineal consanguinity to the decedent [a parent/grand-
parent or a child/grandchild of the decedent]; (3) A spouse or a brother, sister,
uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece of the decedent, yr someone related by lineal con-
sanguinity to any such person; or (4) The spouse of a person otherwise qualified
under this section.
FLA. STAT. § 733-304 (1987).
7. Under Florida law, only children of the testater born after the making of the will are
considered pretermitted. FLA. STAT. § 732.302 (1987). It is difficult if not impossible to disin-
herit children under the laws of most Latin American countries. See, e.g., C61. CiV. arts.
1265-1269 (Colorc.) (list of circumstances, involving principally criminal behavior of descen-
dant forced heirs towards teatator, under which disinheritance is justified); C6D. Civ. arts.
1207-1211 (Chile) (id.).
8. In 1960, Colombia did not recognize vincular divorce in the case of Catholic spouses
who had married in the Catholic Church. See M. G. MONROY CABRA, MATRIMONIO CIVIL Y
DivoRcro EN LA LEGISLACI6N COLOMBIA, 101-02, 172 (1979) [hereinafter MoNRoY CABRA]
(even after recent legislation establishing vincular divorce for spouses married outside the
church, there is no possibility of vincular divorce for Catholics). See also COD. Civ. art. 167
(Colom.) (marital community, but not marital bond, dissolved by separaei6n de cuerpus).
9. In Colombia, one consequence of a separacibn de cuerpos is the liquidation of the
couple's community property. COn. CIv. art. 1820 (Colom.). See generally E. ScoLEs & P.
HAY, CONF'LICT OF LAWs, 449-72 (1952) [hereinafter ScoLEs & HAY] (discussion of the com-
munity property system in general).
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Carlos' generous support of his Colombian family did not end
with his separation from Maria and his move to Miami. Although
the three children from his first marriage had shown him little love
or affection after his separation from their mother, Carlos contin-
ued to permit his eldest Colombian son to use a power of attorney
Carlos had granted to that son in Colombia prior to the separation.
The son used the power of attorney to transfer an additional
$25,000,000 of Carlos' property to his children in Colombia. The
transfers were effected during Carlos' second marriage to Carmen.
The property transferred was primarily Florida real estate Carlos
had acquired after his move to Miami."0
In addition, Carlos transferred certain monies to Jos6 Marti-
nez, Maria's estranged brother, who had moved to Miami around
the same time as Carlos and who had subsequently become quite
close to Carlos, Carmen and their two children. Carlos had depos-
ited those funds in Miami banks in various joint accounts labeled
"Carlos and Jos6, as joint tenants with right of survivorship and
not as tenants in common."'
Carmen obtains letters of administration appointing her per-
sonal representative of Carlos' estate. 2 She identifies the following
assets for purposes of filing the inventory for the estate. 3
10. Thus it would be difficult for Carlos' first wife to claim in Colombia that this Flor-
ida real estate acquired subsequent to the aeparacion de cuerpos is community property.
C6n. Civ. art. 167 (Coloin.).
11. Section 665.063(1)(a) of the Florida Savings Association Act creates a conclusive
presumption that absent fraud or undue influence, funds in joint accounts held in a federal
or state savings and loan association are intended by the parties to vest in the survivor. FLk.
STAT. § 665.063(1)(a) (1987). As regards joint accounts held in Florida-chartered commercial
banks, there is also a presumption that the parties intended such funds to vest in the sur-
viving account holder, but this presumption may be rebutted not only by proof of fraud or
undue influence, but also by "clear and convincing proof of a contrary intent." FLA. STAT. §
668.56(l)-(2) (1987). This disparate treatment of joint accounts in banks and savings and
loans has been held constitutional by the Florida Supreme Court. ri re Estate of Gainer,
466 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1985).
12. Carlos named Carmen his personal representative in his will, as permitted by Faa.
STAT. § 733.301(1}(a) (1987). It should be noted that had Carlos died intestate, Carmen, as
surviving spouse, would be entitled to preference to be personal representative. FLA. STAT. §
733.301(2)(a) (1987). Should Maria contest Carmen's appointment as personal representa-
tive on the ground that she, not Carmen, is Carlos' widow, Maria would have to overcome
the strong presumption under Florida law that the most recent marriage is valid. See In re
Estate of Perez, 470 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d-DCA 1985) (apparent attempts to conceal first mar-
riage when marrying second wife abroad considered important factor in first wife's overcom-
ing presumption of validity of second marriage). Of course, if Maria had filed a complaint,
Carlos might have been found guilty of bigamy, a third degree felony in the state of Florida.
FL&s STAT. § 826.01-.02 (1987).
13. In Florida, the personal representative is required to file an inventory of all known
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A. PROBATE ASSETS [in Carlos' name alone]
1. Colombian coffee plantation
2. Shares of stock in Venezuelan oil production
co. (located in Carlos' Venezuelan lawyer's
office)"
3. Shares in Costa Rican commercial fishing
venture (located in safe deposit box in
Miami)' 5
4. Bank accounts in New York
5. $5,000 Venezuelan gold certificate (issue date
1875) (located in safe deposit box in
Miami)'6
Total:
[Vol. 19:2
Value
$ 3,000,000
1,500,000
4,500,000
2,000,000
10,000,000
$21,000,000
Under Carlos' Florida will, Carmen and her two children would in-
herit a gross estate of $21,000,000 consisting of realty and person-
alty located throughout the world.
The following transfers of Carlos' assets
outside probate upon Carlos' death:
B. JOINT ASSETS PASSING TO CARMEN
(outside of probate)
1. Carmen & Carlos' home in Coral Cables 2
2. Bank accounts in Miami
3. Florida Real Estate
4. Commercial paper (stocks, bonds & promis-
sory notes) (located in safe deposit box in
Miami)
Total:
will take effect
Value
$ 5,000,000
1,000,000
10,000,000
4,000,000
$20,000,000
assets of the estate within 60 days of issuance of letters of administration. FirA- STAr. §
733.604 (1987).
14. Section 731.106 of the Florida Probate Code provides that "[cjommercial paper,
investment paper, and other instruments are located where the instrument is at the time of
death." FL& STAT. § 731.106(1) (1987).
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. If the real property here listed was held by Carlos and Carmen as tenants by the
entireties, that property would not be homestead property. FLA_ STAT. § 732-401(2) (1987).
Because a tenancy by the entireties entails the right of survivorship, the property automati-
cally would pass to Carmen upon Carlos' death. FLA_ STAT. § 689.15 (1987). See In re Estate
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C. JOINT ASSETS PASSING TO MARIA'S ESTRANGED
BROTHER (outside of probate)
Value
1. Bank accounts in Miami' s  $1,000,000
Carlos' estate plan called for approximately $40,000,000 going
to Carmen and their two children, both through probate and
outside probate, and for $1,000,000 to go to Jos6 outside probate.
Of course, by his inter vivos transfers to Maria and her children
upon his separation from Maria and thereafter, his Colombian
family had already received over $30,000,000 from Carlos.
Shortly before the deadline for filing the inventory, Carmen
learns from Maria's estranged brother, Jos6, that Maria and her
children are not content with their $30,000,000. They have initi-
ated probate proceedings in both Colombia and Venezuela to as-
sert their alleged rights to Carlos' estate in those countries. Maria
contends, in effect, that she is entitled to recover from the estate
(and from any of Carlos' transferees) a one-half community prop-
erty share of the assets that were not partitioned in the course of
their separation proceedings, i.e., the property Carlos owned
outside Colombia at the time of the separation.' 9 In addition, Ma-
ria claims that her Colombian separation proceedings did not ter-
minate her status as Carlos' spouse or her right to take a spouse's
share of Carlos' estate.20 Maria has retained a lawyer in Miami to
assert her claims under Florida law to a spouse's elective share of
the estate t 1 and to recover a community property share of the as-
of Silvian, 347 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (tenancy by the entireties expressly
excepted from § 689.15, purpose of which is to abolish right of survivorship in joint tenan-
cies where right not expressly mentioned).
18. See FLA. STAT. § 665.063 (1)(a) (1987).
19. Separation proceedings in Colombia entail the liquidation of community property.
See C6D. Civ. art. 1820 (CoLom.). In Colombia, if one spouse fraudulently conceals commu-
nity property in connection with a liquidation of the marital community, not only does that
spouse forfeit the normal one-half interest in the concealed property, but must return to the
community a sum equal to double the property. C6n. Cirv. art. 1824 (Calom.).
20. See infra, notes 32-35 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the effects in
Colombia of a separacidn de cuerpos on the separated spouse's status as intestate heir or
right to an elective share.
21. Under Florida law, the surviving spouse of a resident decedent may claim an elec-
tive share equivalent to 30% of the fair market value on the date of death of all property of
the decedent wherever located that is subject to administration, except real property not
located in Florida. Fti STAT. §§ 732.201, 732.206-207 (1987). There is, however, no elective
share in Florida property for the surviving spouse of a nonresident decedent. EA. STAT, §
732.205 (1987).
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sets Carlos had transferred to Carmen through joint ownership. 2
Finally, under the forced heirship laws of Colombia and Venezuela,
Maria's children contest their disinheritance by Carlos' will.
2 3
As in many multinational probate cases, the above situation
requires that counsel for all parties evaluate a host of choice of law
rules, substantive principles of several legal systems, and complex
jurisdictional issues. Although Carlos died domiciled in Florida
with a majority of his assets located in Florida, representation of
his Florida wife plainly can no longer be confined to the Florida
courts and to Florida law. Indeed, in virtually every Florida pro-
bate proceeding where a decedent leaves property in various juris-
dictions and has family ties outside Florida, it will be critical for
attorneys to familiarize themselves with the choice of law rules of
Florida and any other domestic forum involved, as well as with the
substantive principles, choice of law rules and procedural law of
each jurisdiction where the decedent had ever maintained property
or residence 2 4
In such cases, the importance of the foreign elements cannot
be overemphasized. For example, the courts of other states or for-
eign countries may not recognize and enforce the decree of a Flor-
ida probate court purporting to determine title to property within
their jurisdiction.2 In the case of Carlos' Colombian plantation
22. This claim might not prosper under Colombian law, because property acquired after
the liquidation of the marital community subsequent to a separaci~n de cuerpos arguably is
not part of that now inexistent community. See supra note 10.
23. COD. CIv. arts. 1239-1264 (Colom.); COD. Civ. arts. 883-887 (Venez.). Children of the
testator are entitled, in most civil law jurisdictions, to a forced heirship or "legitimate por-
tion" (la legitima) and save limited exceptions, cannot be disinherited to the extent of that
forced heirship. See Opton, Recognition of Foreign Heirship and Succession Rights to Per-
Bonal Property in America, 19 GED. WAsH. L. REV. 156, 180-82 (1950). For a summary of
forced heirships in Europe, see R. LAWRENCE), INTERNATIONAL TAX AND ESTATE PLANNING 40-
41, App. A (1983) [hereinafter LAWRENCE]; see also Yiannopoulos, Wills of Movables in
American International Conflicts Law: A Critique of the Domiciliary "Rule," 46 CALIF. L.
REV. 185, 221-42 (1958) [hereinafter Yiannopoulosi.
24. See generally StOLES & HAY, supra note 9, at 766-99; 822-76 (1982); Heilman, In-
terpretation and Construction of Wills of Immovables in Conflict of Laws Cases Involving
"Election," 25 ILL. L. REV. 778 (193I)i Scales, Conflict of Laws in Estate Planning, 9 U. FLA.
L REv. 398 (1956)[hereinafter Scoles, Estate Planning]; Scoles, Conflict of Laws and
Nonbarrable Interests in Administration of Decedents' Estates, 9 U. FLA. L. Rev. 151
(1955)[hereinafter Scales, Nonbarrable Interest]; Scales & Rheinstein, Conflict Avoidance
in Succession Planning, 21 LAW & CONTEMP. PaOns. 499 (1956); Stimson, Conflict of Laws
and the Administration of Decedents' Real Estate, 6 VAND. L. REV. 545 (1953); Stimson,
Conflict of Laws and the Administration of Decedents' Personal Property, 46 VA. L. Rev.
1345 (1960).
25. For a general discussion of the enforcement of Florida judgments abroad, see gener-
ally Bishop & Burnette, United States Practice Concerning the Recognition of Foreign
294 [Vol. 19:2
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and Costa Rican fishing venture stock, for example, or his Vene-
zuelan gold certificate and oil company shares, or even his New
York bank accounts, the courts in Colombia, Venezuela and New
York might not defer to a Florida court's determination as to the
rightful distributees of those assets.2 8 Similarly, although Carlos
died a Florida resident with a will prepared and executed in Flor-
ida, courts in Florida, and a fortiori courts outside of Florida, may
not apply Florida law to all questions raised as to the proper distri-
bution of Carlos' assets."
In view of the proceedings that Maria has already commenced
in Colombia and Venezuela, and in view of the tremendous
amounts at stake in those countries as well as in New York, it is
essential to retain Colombian, Venezuelan and New York counsel
to assist in evaluating Maria's claims under the laws of those juris-
dictions. Nevertheless, despite the assistance of local counsel, a
working knowledge of foreign law and procedure is becoming in-
creasingly important to the U.S. attorney's ability to defend a de-
cedent's out-of-state property from foreign claimants. In fact, such
knowledge also will be important in protecting a foreign decedent's
Florida estate from foreign claimants, because rulings by foreign
courts could affect substantially the outcome of the probate pro-
ceedings in Florida.
III. THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICA
A. Economic and Legal Consequences of Decedent's Marital
Situation
Under the laws of Colombia, 8 as in most civil law jurisdic-
tions,2 0 property acquired by either spouse during marriage is clas-
Judgments, 16 INT'L LAW. 425 (1982) [hereinafter Bishop & Burnette]; Larsen, Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in Latin America: Trends and Individual Differences, 17 Trx. INT'L
L.J. 213 (1982) [hereinafter Larsen]; Note, Foreign Nation Judgments: Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Judgments in Florida and the Status of Florida Judgments Abroad,
31 U. FLA. L. REv. 588, 623-29 (1979) [hereinafter Foreign Judgments in Floridal.
26. See generally Larsen, supra note 25; Hopkins, The Extraterritorial Effect of Pro-
bate Decrees, 53 YALE LA. 221 (1944).
27. See Yiannoupoulos, supra note 23; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS §§ 239-242, 257-260, 263-265 (1969).
28. COD. Civ. art. 180 (Clom.. See generally MONROY CABRA, supra note 8 (lutes as to
what assets are community property and how the community is administered and liqui-
dated); 5 VALnEcca ZFA, DEnEcSo Civa. DE ECHO DE FAMILIA (1978).
29. See, e.g., C6D. CrV. art. 135 (Chile); Cbn. Cir. art. 148 (Venez.) (in the absence of an
antenuptial agreement, "son comunes, de por mitad, las ganancias o beneficios que se
1987-881
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sified as community property in which each owns an undivided
fifty percent share."0 We will assume for purposes of the following
discussion that all property acquired by decedent during his first
Colombian marriage is community property under Colombian
law.3 1
In 1960, decedent and his Colombian spouse were separated
by judicial decree.3 2 Although similar in many respects to divorce
in the United States, these separation proceedings did not consti-
tute a vinculo divorce and decedent was not permitted, under the
laws of Colombia, to remarry. 33 Thus, under Colombian law, the
obtengn durante el matrimoanio"); C6D, Civ. art. 126 (Guat.) (if no antenuptial agreement,
assets acquired during coverture are community property)- Cn. Civ. art. 1400 (Dom. Rep.)
(if no antenuptial agreement, spouses are governed by community property rules); COD. Cr.
art. 176 (Peruj; COD. Civ. art. 258 (Braz.); C6D. Civ. arts. 1315-1316 (Spain) (if no antenup-
tial agreement, community property system); of tIC.D.F. (Mex.), art. 178 (marriage must he
either according to the community property system or a separate property system; the par-
ties enjoy wide discretion as to the details of content and administration of marital and
personal assets); COD. Civ. art. 40 (Costa Rica) (in the absence of an antenuptial agreement,
the marriage is deemed contracted under a system of absolute separation of assets); CoD.
Civ. art. 169 (Hoand.) (spouses may establish any agreement they wish as to their property, if
there is no agreement, there is absolute separation of property); COD. Civ. art. 1163 (Pan.)
(same).
30. In the United States, the following states recognize the community property system
by statute: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washing-
ton. With respect to the characterization of marital property as community property or sep-
arate property in the case of migrant couples within the United States, see Annotation,
Change of Domicile as Affecting Character of Property Previously Acquired as Separate or
Community Property, 14 A.L.R. 3d 404 (1967); see also Clausnitzer, Property Rights of the
Surviving Spouses and the Conflict of Laws, 18 J. FAM. L. 471 (1979) [hereinafter Claus-
nitzerl; Juenger, Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws: A Tate of Two Countries, 81
COLUM. L. Rsv. 1061 (1981) [hereinafter Juenger].
31. COD. Civ. arts. 1781, 1830 (Colom.).
32. Indeed, by obtaining the decree, they did everything permitted to them under Co-
lombian law to dissolve their marital and economic bonds. Until 1976, vincular divorce was
not accepted under Colombian law, and after the la Ley of 1976, was possible only for civil
marriage as opposed to religious, i.e., Catholic marriage, in which vincular divorce remains
impossible. COD. Civ. arts 152, 167 (Colom.). See MONROv CASRA, supra note 8, at 172- Dis-
enchanted Catholic spouses may obtain nothing more than a separacion do cuerpos (divorce
ad mensa et thore) or a separacibn de bienes. C6D. Civ. arts. 165-168 (Colom.) (separacihn
de cuerpos), 197-208 (Colom.) (separaci6n de bienes), both of which have as a primary con-
sequence the liquidation of the marital community, or sociedad conyugal. We are assuming
for purposes of this article that Carlos and Maria obtained a separacihn de cuerpos, by
judicial decree based on a complaint filed by Maria. Colombian law now permits separacihn
de cuerpos by mutual consent. COn. Civ. arL 115(2) (CoLom.). Vincular divorce even in the
case of Catholic marriages is now admitted in Mexico, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Argentina (Law No. 23.515 of 1987), Bolivia, Brazil, Ecua-
dor, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. There is no vincular divorce in Chile or Paraguay, nor
for Catholic marriages in Colombia or in the Dominican Republic celebrated after August 6,
1954.
33. C6n. Civ. arts. 140(2), 167 (Colom.).
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Colombian wife remained decedent's spouse until his death.3
Economically, however, decedent's separation was very similar
to a vinculo divorce. Their community property ties were termi-
nated, and the community was definitively severed by that de-
cree. However, and of critical importance to our case, Colombian
law requires that at the time of their separation, all community
property owned by the spouses, whether acquired in Colombia or
elsewhere, be divided between them, or "partitoned."5 6
In our hypothetical, only Colombian community property was
partitioned in the course of the separation." To the extent the Co-
lombian spouse can demonstrate that non-Colombian community
assets were not partitioned in the Colombian separation, she would
have the right under Colombian law to bring a proceeding to ob-
tain her community share of these non-Colombian assets.38 Indeed,
34. COD. Civ. art. 167 (Colom.).
35. Id. Divorce in the case of civil marriages in Colombia not only dissolves the marital
community but also specifically terminates any right of either spouse to inherit from the
other as intestate heir or to claim the marital portion (porcibn canyugal]. C6D. Civ. art, 162
(Colon.).
36. C6D. CIV. arts. 1830, 1832 (Colon.). Rules for determining what assets are commu-
nity property and what constitutes separate property are contained in C6D. Civ. arts- 1781-
1804 (Colom.). Rules are also included for determining what expenses are to be charged or
reimbursed to each of the spouses. Id. No distinction is made in these rules between realty
or personalty situated in Colombia and assets situated abroad.
37. This is a situation frequently encountered in cases involving United States realty
owned by Latin American clients. Many Latin American countries strictly regulate invest-
ment abroad by their citizens. Nationals of those countries, therefore, often do not want any
United States property listed in an inventory made in the country of their nationality. Also,
such United States property is often the object of "side" agreements in the framework of a
division of community property because it is felt that such agreements, executed in the
United States, will achieve their objectives more easily and more quickly, This reasoning
stems from the fact that the agreements can be drawn up and executed in the United
States, by local lawyers and in compliance with local requirements, and may be recorded
with less difficulty than if executed in another country with the attendant difficulties of
authentication, legalization and notarization, often requiring the intervention of U. S. con-
sular personnel.
,9. CD. Civ. art. 1832 (Colom.) (provides that the division of the community property
shall be carried out following the rules given for the partition of decedents! estates). Article
620 of the Colombian C6digo de Procedimiento Civil provides for a partici6n adicional or
additional judicial partition which calls for an additional inventory that shall include only
property that was not included in the first inventory. See H. MoRALES, CURSo DE DEciO
Puocsi Civm, 487-88 (1960). Such a proceeding conceptually does not affect the separa-
tion agreement, nor does it constitute a reopening of the separation procedure. By operation
of law, a partition of community property pursuant to a marital separation (de cuerpos or
de bienes) coVers all community property. The fact that one spouse may have neglected to
include, or fraudulently failed to include, certain property is not a ground for setting aside
the separation itself, as might be the case with a Florida property settlement agreement. In
Colombia, the concealing spouse runs the risk of losing the property in question and of
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this is one of the principal claims of the Colombian spouse in her
present action in Colombia.
B. Succession to Decedent's Colombian Estate Under Co-
lombian Law
1. Colombian Choice of Law Rules
The Colombian Civil Code provides that succession to a dece-
dent's assets, both personal and real, generally should be deter-
mined under the law of the decedent's last domicile. 9 However,
there are certain important exceptions to this general rule.40 When
a Colombian national dies domiciled in a foreign country, the Co-
lombian courts will recognize the succession rights of his Colom-
bian forced heirs under Colombian law to the exclusion of the law
of decedent's last domicile, at least to the extent necessary to pro-
tect the Colombian forced heirs.41 Moreover, Colombian courts will
apply Colombian law with respect to the succession to real or per-
sonal property located within the borders of Colombia.42
In our hypothetical case, Florida law would not affect the dis-
position of decedent's Colombian coffee plantation and his shares
in the Costa Rican commercial fishing venture, since Colombian
courts would be likely to apply Colombian law to this Colombian
property.43 Thus, another reason for the Colombian wife to pro-
having to return double its value to the community (C6D. CIV. art. 1824 (Colom.)). and of
course the injured spouse may bring an additional partition proceeding. COD. Civ. art. 1826
(Colom.). Thus, there is no requirement that there be "full disclosure" in the American
sense of that term in connection with a Colombian separation, because by law the separa-
tion will cover all property that qualifies as community property. For the same reason, it is
irrelevant to inquire into the "intent" of the spouses who are presumed to know the conse-
quences of their separation. Thus, a Colombian separation of community property agree-
ment, .onstitutes a "complete property settlement" in the sense of § 732.702 of the Florida
Probate Code. See FLA. STAT. § 732.702 (1987).
39. C6n. Crv. art- 1012 (Colom.).
40. CD. Ci. arts. 1012, 1054 (Colon.); see also CAicESoo CASnLLA, DEECHO I r TLRNA-
CIONAL PRIVAno 425-29 (1960) (general discussion of Colombian conflicts rules relating to
decedents' estates); P. EDisa. AMERICAN-COLOMBIAN PEIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 47-55
(1956) lhereinafter EDER].
41. COD. Crv. art- 19 (Colom.). See ErER, supra note 40, at 48.
42. RDER, supra note 40, at 48. Eder points out that there is disagreement among the
writers as to whether article 20 of the Civil Code of Colombia, which provides that property
situated in Colombia is subject to Colombian law, constitutes an e xeption to article 1012,
whereby successions mortis causa are governed by the law of decedent's domicile at death.
Id. at 50, n,90.
43. Florida courts may purport to assume jurisdiction over decedent's personal prop-
erty located in Colombia, because under Florida law, courts of the decedent's domicile, have
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ceed in Colombia is to insure that decedent's attempt to disinherit
her and her children, in his Florida will, fails by virtue of the
forced heirship provisions of Colombian law.
2. Colombian Substantive Law of Succession
If the Florida spouse retains counsel in Colombia to present
decedent's Florida will to a Colombian court, the formal validity of
the will will be the preliminary issue to be addressed. If the Co-
lombian courts hold that decedent's Florida will was not validly
executed under Colombian law, or if the Florida spouse does not
present her claims based on the Florida will in Colombia, the Co-
lombian laws of intestate succession will apply.45 Under Colombia
intestacy laws, the Florida wife would take nothing because under
Colombian law the Colombian spouse, not the Florida wife, would
be recognized as the surviving spouse.46 In any event, under the
Colombian laws of intestacy, the surviving spouse does not take as
an intestate heir when the decedent is survived by his children,
although she may take a conjugal portion, which in intestate es-
tates, is a forced share equal to that of a legitimate descendant.4 7
The conjugal portion, however, is not available to a spouse who has
jurisdiction to determine the distribution of his personal assets wherever located. However,
because it would seem likely that in Colombia a foreign decree will have no effect on how
personal or real property located in Colombia is distributed, the Colombian courts are likely
to ignore a Florida decree favorable to decedent's Florida wife regarding the distribution of
decedent's personalty located in Colombia. See EDER, supra note 40, at 54 (citing Succession
of Morelli, 52 G.J. 811-14 (1941)) (Colombian court would not recognize Italian decree).
44. EDos, supra note 40, at 53 (testamentary provisions in wills executed abroad relat-
ing to property situate in Colombia are subject to Colombian law). See C6n Civ_ arts. 1084,
1085 (Colom.) (Colombian residents may execute a will abroad in the Colombian consulate
of their residence with the formalities prescribed in Colombian law).
45. C6n. Civ. art. 1037 (Colom.). See H. CARsZOSA PARDO, LAS SUCESIONES 155-59 (41
Edici6n 1959) [hereinafter CAxmzosA PaDO].
46. A separacion de cuerpas does not dissolve the marriage bond in Colombia in the
case of a Catholic marriage. C6D. Civ. art. 167 (Colom.).
47. C6D. Civ. arts. 1045, 1236 (Colom.). For a discussion of the alternatives available to
a surviving spouse under Colombian law (spouse's forced share (conjugal portion or porci6n
conyugal), intestate share and of course her half of the community property), see CARRIZOSA
PAnno, supra note 45, at 377-93. Carrizosa Pardo points out that when a decedent is sur-
vived by the spouse and descendants, the spouse is not, technically speaking, an intestate
heir, but takes a conjugal portion which is an equal per capita share with the descendants-
Id. at 389. In community property jurisdictions, it is generally considered that the surviving
spouse is sufficiently protected by the half of the community property received upon dece-
dent's death, and does not need the added protection of a substantial intestate share of the
estate.
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received her share of the community property. "8
Even if the Florida spouse does present, in a Colombian court,
the Florida decree admitting decedent's will to probate in Florida,
and even if the formal validity of the will is recognized in Colom-
bia,4" Colombian restrictions upon testamentary disinheritance
must still be considered!10 Under Colombian law, the decedent's
children, as forced heirs are entitled to take against the will, an
equal per capita share of one half of the estate as their legitima or
legitimate portion.5 ' This is true under Colombian law for both
adopted and illegitimate children.52 Therefore, decedent's adopted
child, as well as the "illegitimate" children decedent had with his
second wife in Florida, will have the same right in Colombia to a
forced heirship as the legitimate children of decedent's first mar-
riage. The Colombian spouse, however, in all likelihood would not
be able to claim an interest in the Colombian estate, because she
has already received her community property interest in connec-
tion with her separation from decedent.53
48. See infra note 53.
49. It is likely that Colombian courts would recognize decedent's Florida will as validly
executed based on the Florida probate decree, notwithstanding that decedent may have
failed to comply with the formalities required of a will executed in Colombia. EDER, supra
note 40, at 48-49. Colombian law generally provides that an instrument, valid where exe-
cuted, is valid in Colombia. COD. Cir. art, 1084 (Colom.). Colombian courts would likely
treat as valid wills executed in the United States as valid where the decree admitting those
wills to probate is presented- Id.
80. See supra, note 23. Thus, decedent's attempt to disinherit his Colombian children
would not prosper under the circumstances of our hypothetical. Assuming the Colombian
court would admit the Florida will, as a matter of public policy, it nevertheless would apply
the Colombian law of forced heirship to decedent's Colombian estate, under which one half
of the estate descends to all the children in equal parts, one quarter, the mejora, may be
distributed to one or more of the forced heirs (here, the children), but to no other heirs, in
any way the testator wishes, and the remaining one quarter may be freely disposed of by the
testator (here, to the Florida children). See Cdn. Civ. arts. 1225-1264 (Colom.). Colombian
law provides for a modification of any will that does not respect these forced heirship provi-
sions. Id. arts. 1274-1278. See also EDER, supra note 40, at 49-50 (pursuant to art. 19, COD.
Crv., succession of a Colombian who dies domiciled in a foreign country is governed, as to
the Colombian wife and relatives, by Colombian law, which determines inter alia all rights
in succession opened in the foreign country that derive from separation, order of inheri-
ance, tegitirna, conjugal or community share, etc.).
51. C6D. Civ. arts. 1240-1242 (Colon.). While the invalidity of the Florida marriage
would render decedent's children by his Florida wife illegitimate under Colombian law, this
illegitimacy would have no impact upon their rights of succession. Colombian law provides
that the illegitimate children of a decedent take equally with the legitimate children. C6D.
Civ. arts. 1045 (intestacy), 1240(1) (Colom.) (testate succession) (as modified by Law 29 of
1982).
52. Cn'Crtv. art. 1240(t) (Colon.).
53. As a general rule, a surviving spouse under Colombian law has the choice between
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C. The Rights of the Parties Under Venezuelan Law
In Venezuela, as in Colombia, the Colombian wife and her
children seek to acquire their interest in the property decedent
owned in that jurisdiction at his death, including their rights to
decedent's $10,000,000 gold certificate. As in Colombia, Venezuelan
courts will apply their own law with regard to the distribution of
decedent's forum property, whether or not the decedent or his
heirs have any relationship to Venezuela. 4 Moreover, Venezuela
will apply its own law to determine the spouse's community inter-
est in the decedent's property." If the Florida spouse presents the
decedent's Florida will in Venezuela, and assuming Venezuela ree-
taking her half of the community property or opting for the conjugal portion (porcibn cony-
ugal), which would be an equal (to that of the children) per capita share of 50% of the
estate. In effect, in cases where there is a surviving spouse and children of the decedent, the
spouse is counted as another child of the decedent, except in very limited circumstances.
Because in our hypothetical the wife has already received her 50% share of the community
property she had with decedent following their separation, she would not be entitled to this
porcidn conyugal which might be compared to a sort of elective share, mutatis mutandis.
See CARRIZOSA PARI, supra note 45, at 387. The result would he in this case that despite
decedent's Florida will, each of decedent's five children would be entitled to a one-fifth part
of 50% of the Colombian estate. It is conceivable that the Colombian court, assuming it
recognized the validity of the Florida will, would construe the Florida will as validly trans-
ferring to the Florida children the 25% mejora and to the Florida "spouse" and children the
25% of libre disposicibn, or free disposition.
54. COD. Civ. art. 10 (Venez.). See generally R, LOMBARD, AMERICAN-VENEZUELAN PRI-
VATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 53-61 (1965) [hereinafter LOMBARD]. Venezuelan law governs the
nature of property rights in Venezuelan assets left by decedent. Id. at 56.
55. See LOMBARD, supra note E4, at 43 (citing Baro v. Arque, 3d Civ. Ct. of First In-
stance, Fed. Dist. Jan. 25, 1952, Gaceta de Tribunales, Feb. 1952, p.1; rev'd, 2d Civ. Sup.
Ct., Fed. Dist. Mar. 28, 1952, Gaceta de Tribunales, Aug. 1952, p. 4). In Baro, the Venezue-
lan court applied Venezuelan law to determine the effect of the laws of succession and of
community property upon the distribution of real property located in Venezuela and be-
longing to an intestate decedent, despite the fact that the decedent and all of the interested
claimants were residents of Spain. Id. Venezuela ratified the Bustamante Code of Private
International Law with reservations. Id. at 53. The Cddigo Bustamante of 1928 was ratified
by many of the Central and South American countries in the form of a treaty. See A.
ENRENZWEIC, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 23 (1962) (COdigo Bustamante was ratified
by all Central American States and Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela). It
is applicable in theory only to conflict cases involving property or nationals of the signatory
countries. The United States never signed nor ratified the Bustamante Code, in part be-
cause of certain difficulties created by the United States federal system. In certain cases,
nevertheless, the COdigo Bustamante may be consulted usefully for its orientation as to the
position Venezuelan courts might take in a given international conflict of laws situation.
See, e.g., Judgment of June 21, 1961, Ct. Sup. Dist. Fed. Jurisprudencia Ramirez y Garay,
(1e semestre 1961, p. 57) (although Codigo de Bustamante only applies to contracting
states, it indicates legislative intent of provisions of Venezuelan law), cited in T. DE
MAKELT, MATERIAL DE CLASE PARA DEREcHo INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 152 (1979).
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ognizes the formal validity of the will, 6 the Venezuelan restrictions
upon disinheritance as well as Venezuela's community property
laws must be examinedY57 Under Venezuelan law, a surviving
spouse is entitled to a fifty percent share of the couple's commu-
nity property. 8 The surviving spouse's community share is not
considered part of the decedent's estate. 9 The Colombian wife's
share in the Venezuelan community property will pass to her inde-
pendently of the estate. However, because of her separation, she
will have no rights as a forced heir to the decedent's property. 0
In sum, even if decedent's Florida will were to be considered
by Venezuelan courts, it is unlikely decedent's Florida wife and her
children would receive anywhere close to the $12,000,000 in Vene-
zuelan assets that decedent intended should pass to them. First,
the Colombian children would each be able to take their forced
share in decedent's Venezuelan property. Second, Venezuela quite
probably would recognize the Colombian wife's community prop-
erty claim to decedent's Venezuelan assets on the ground they
were community property and never partitioned in connection
with her separation. Thus, a substantial portion of the Venezuelan
assets decedent intended for his Florida wife and children, would
pass instead to the Colombian spouse and children.6 '
The law that foreign courts would be likely to apply in the
jurisdictions where the first wife is litigating could lead to alarming
56. C6n. Crv. art. 879 (Venez.). It appears that Venezuela, like Colombia, would recog-
nize the Florida will as valid upon presentation of the Florida decree admitting that will to
probate. See generally LOMEAnM, supra note 54, at 57-59.
57. Forced heirs lose their right to a forced heirship only in certain cases specifically set
forth in article 810 of the Venezuelan Civil Code. Forced heirships (the legitimate portion or
legitima) is governed by articles 883-87 of the Venezuelan Civil Code. See generally E_
CALVO BACA, MANUAL DE DERECHO CIVIL VENEZOLANO 233-38 (1984) [hereinafter CArvo
BAcA].
58. C6D. Civ. arts. 148, 173, 183 (Venez.). See CALVO BACA, supra note 57, at 55-60.
59. Cn vo BAcA, supra note 57, at 202 (community property rules are separate from
rules of inheritance; surviving spouse in principle has already received her half of the com-
munity property before partition of the estate, such estate of course includes the community
property share of the decedent).
60. The general rule in Venezuela is that when an intestate decedent is survived by a
spouse and children, the children and the spouse take equal shares per capita of the estate.
COD. Civ. art. 824 (Venesz.). See CALVO BACA, supra note 57, at 201-02. In Venezuela, how-
ever, the law is clear that when the spouses have obtained a final separacidn do bienes, each
forfeits his right to inherit ab intestato from the other. Id. at 200; C6n. Crv. art. 831
(Venez.)_
61. For a discussion of the Colombian spouse's community property claim to property
such as the Venezuelan assets that decedent acquired during their marriage, see text accom-
panying notes 75-81, infra.
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results for the Florida wife's interests in decedent's estate. With
regard to decedent's Latin American assets, there exists a clear and
present possibility that the Colombian spouse could succeed in
wresting away part of the estate through her community property
claims in Colombia and Venezuela. More importantly, the determi-
nation by a Colombian court that certain marital rights of the Co-
lombian spouse in decedent's estate survived the separation, if
given effect by Florida courts, could prove to be devastating in
Florida to decedent's Florida wife. In plotting strategy, therefore,
the next step for the Florida wife's counsel is to consider the im-
pact of the Latin American proceedings and law on the Florida
proceedings.
IV. THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES IN FLORIDA - THE FIRST
WIFE'S FLORIDA STRATEGY
A. Preliminary Considerations
1. Jurisdiction
Because decedent died while domiciled in Florida, it is clear
that Florida is an appropriate forum in which to probate his Flor-
ida estate.0 2 In Florida, as in most jurisdictions, real property is
properly probated, as a jurisdictional matter, in the forum where it
is located. 3 Jurisdiction to probate personalty will lie where such
property is located or at the decedent's last domicile.6 4 Thus, Flor-
ida courts will clearly take jurisdiction to probate decedent's Flor-
ida realty, as well as his personalty, wherever located." It is
equally clear that if decedent's Colombian wife wishes to pursue
her claims to decedent's Florida property, she must be prepared to
litigate in Florida.
62. FLA. STAT. § 733.101(1)(a) (1987). See, e.g., SCOLES & HAY, supra note 9, at 823
(principal place of probate of will and administration of decedent's estate normally is in
state where decedent was domiciled at death).
63. See, e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, 125 Fla. 855, 170 So. 856, 868 (1936); In re Estate of
Swanson, 397 So. 2d 465, 466 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); In re Estate of Siegel, 350 So. 2d 89, 90-
91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
64. See In re Estate of Siegel, 350 So. 2d 89, 91 (discussing the maxim mobilia seguun-
tur personam).
65. Of course, this does not mean that foreign courts will recognize Florida's jurisdic-
tion over personal property within their own borders. See, e.g., EDER, supra note 40, at 53
(property situated in Colombia governed by Colombian law and distributed in accordance
therewith); LOMBARD, supra note 64, at 54 (assets located in Venezuela are subject to forced
shares regardless of nationality or domicile of testator).
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In addition, because foreign courts are likely to accept juris-
diction over part of decedent's estate, the effect of foreign probate
judgments in Florida probate proceedings is an important factor to
be considered in establishing overall strategy. There is authority in
Florida for the proposition that Florida courts, in probating a non-
resident decedent's Florida estate, will give effect to probate de-
crees from decedent's last domicile. 6 However, if the decedent was
a Florida resident, Florida courts would not defer to the probate
decrees of courts in other jurisdictions in determining how the de-
cedent's Florida property should be distributed. 7 This is so even if
all interested parties were present in the foreign probate forum.
2. Location of Assets
Generally speaking, it is not difficult to determine the location
of real property and tangible personal property. However, a pre-
liminary issue often arises as to the location of intangible personal
property such as commercial paper, stocks, bonds and notes for ju-
risdictional and choice of law purposes."5 For example, in our hy-
pothetical, decedent left commercial paper in Miami evidencing
obligations owed to him by debtors in various other countries. The
question thus arises as to whether this property is situated in Flor-
ida, where the paper evidencing the obligation is found, or else-
where, i.e., where the debtors reside. The importance of this issue
can be appreciated with respect to the Venezuelan gold certificate:
the paper is in Florida, but the debtor is in Venezuela. The ques-
tion is crucial because distribution of the $10,000,000 may differ
66. See Biederman v. Cheatham, 161 So. 2d 538, 543 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964) (citing Loe-
wenthal v. Mandell, 125 Fla- 685, 170 So- 169, 173-74 (1936)).
67. See Trotter v. Van Pelt, 144 Fla. 517, 198 So. 215 (1940); Murphy v. Murphy, 125
Fia 855, 170 So. 856 (1936); see also In re Estate of Swanson, 397 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 2d DOA
1981). See generally Hopkins, The Extraterritorial Effect of FProbate Decrees. 53 YALE LA.
221 (1944). However, foreign decrees concerning related issues, such as status, might well be
given effect by the Florida courts. See infra note 75. Moreover, Florida courts might defer to
rulings by foreign courts concerning such issues as the status of property as community
property, at least where all parties claiming rights to that property are before the foreign
court. See Quintana v. Ordono, 195 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967).
68. In the United States, where choice of law does not depend on the location of per-
Bonalty, the issue of the location of intangibles will affect jurisdiction only. In Latin
America, however, where the courts generally apply forum law to personalty within their
borders, this issue can be outcome determinative. It has been held in Florida that Florida
courts have. authority tn determine the jurisdiction of n foreign court. Lewis v. Hodges, 254
So. 2d 397, 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971) (Florida as forum court may determine that decedent
was not domiciled in Georgia and that letters of administration granted by a Georgia court
must fail).
[Vol. 19:2
TRANSNATIONAL PROBATE
depending upon whether the certificate is deemed to be located in
Venezuela (requiring application of Venezuelan law) or in Florida
(requiring application of Florida law) 9
The rule in most U.S. jurisdictions is that the situs of negotia-
ble instruments is the place where the paper is found, while the
situs of non-negotiable instruments is where the debtor is found.70
If this rule applies, the Venezuelan gold certificate will be distrib-
uted in accordance with the laws of Florida, since that is where the
certificate itself is found, whereas decedent's Venezuelan oil com-
pany shares will be distributed in accordance with Venezuelan law
because the stock certificates were kept in decedent's lawyer's of-
fice in Caracas.
3. Applicable Law
The Colombian spouse ultimately will have to resort to the
Florida courts for determination of her various claims to dece-
dent's property. However, this does not mean that her claims will
be governed exclusively by Florida law. Florida choice of law rules,
which have preliminary applicability in the case of a decedent who
died domiciled in Florida, are as follows: (1) the formal validity of
a will is governed by the laws of the place of execution; 7' (2) suc-
cession to personalty is determined by the law of the decedent's
last domicile;"2 (3) succession to real estate is determined by the
law of the situs of the property;72 (4) the validity and effect of pre-
nuptial and separation agreements is determined by the law of the
place of execution or the marital domicile at the time of execu-
tion; 4 (5) personal status, i.e., the relationship of a person to the
decedent, is determined by the law of the family domicile;7 (6) the
status of assets as community property or separate property is de-
69. The practitioner, of course, must consider whether a foreign court of the place
where the asset underlying a negotiable instrument, or the place where the debtor is domi-
ciled, will also consider the location of the asset to be where the paper is located.
70. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 731-106(1) (1987).
71. FLA. STAT. § 732.502(2). Cf. In re Estate of Swanson, 397 So. 2d 465, 467 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1981) (pointing out possible hiatus in present law where will is invalid under law of the
place of testator's domicile at time of execution or death but also invalid under law of place
of execution).
72. See, e.g., In re Estate of Siegel, 350 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
73. Trotter v. Van Pelt, 144 Fla. 517, 198 So. 215, 217 (1940); Frazier v. Boggs, 37 Fla.
307, 20 So- 245 (1896)-
74. See Gesslor v. Gessler, 273 F.2d 302, 304 (5th Cir. 1959); Hagen v. Viney, 124 Fla.
747, 169 So. 391, 394 (196).
75. See Goldman v. Dithrich, 131 Fla. 408, 179 So. 715 (1938).
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termined by the law of the marital domicile at the time the prop-
erty was acquired; 6 (7) a foreign divorce decree is given effect as to
status if either spouse was domiciled in the rendering forum,
whether or not the other spouse was present;7 7 and (8) a foreign
divorce decree is given effect as to financial relations between the
spouses, if it meets the requirements applicable to foreign judg-
ments settling personal disputes, i.e., both parties must have ap-
peared before the rendering court. 8
Like most choice of law principles, those applied in Florida are
subject to exceptions more numerous than can be discussed in this
article. However, they are applied in Florida often enough to form
the basis for predicting the possible outcome in Florida of an inter-
national probate contest and for mapping out a preliminary strat-
egy. Application of these basic rules to the foreign spouse's claims
will also provide some guidance as to the issues to be addressed
when defending the Florida wife's rights in Florida courts.
In our hypothetical, decedent died domiciled in Florida leav-
ing real property with a situs in that state. Thus, Florida substan-
tive law should apply to decedent's real property and would deter-
mine: (1) the validity of decedent's testamentary dispositions as to
this Florida property; (2) the status of the property acquired by
decedent after his separation from his first wife, in Colombia and
subsequent move to Miami; and (3) the validity of his marriage in
Florida and consequently the legitimacy of the two children he had
with his Florida wife. However, under Florida conflicts principles,
Colombian law should apply to determine: (1) the status as com-
munity or separate property of the assets decedent acquired in
Florida during his Colombian marriage; (2) the effect of the Co-
lombian separation agreement and decree upon the Colombian
spouse's rights to that property; and (3) the continuing validity vel
non of the Colombian first marriage.
76- Quintana v. Ordono, 195 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967).
77. Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1950); Kitte] v. Kittel, 194 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1967); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 143 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962).
78. Pawley. 46 So. 2d at 473.
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B. The Colombian Wife's Community Property Interest in
Certain Assets of Decedent's Estate
1. Law Applicable to Characterization of Assets
Florida conflicts law provides that assets are characterized as
community property or separate property pursuant to the law of
the jurisdiction of the marital domicile at the time the property
was acquired.l This applies regardless of the present situs of the
property and regardless of the jurisdiction within which the prop-
erty was acquired. 0 Therefore, although Florida is not a commu-
nity property jurisdiction, an asset in Florida will be treated as
community property if it was acquired by a married resident of a
community property jurisdiction. 1
When the marital domicile changes during marriage, however,
the issue is less clear. In particular, the question arises as to the
status of property owned by spouses originally domiciled in a com-
munity property jurisdiction who later move to a non-community
property jurisdiction.2 Generally recognized choice of law rules
provide that only the property acquired by the spouses prior to the
change of marital domicile would be treated as community prop-
erty. 3 Property acquired subsequently in the non-community
property forum would be treated as the separate property of the
acquiring spouse.8 4
In our hypothetical, the status of property acquired by dece-
dent during his Colombian marriage will be determined by the
Florida courts in accordance with Colombian law.88 Like most
Latin American civil law countries, Colombia is a community prop-
79. Quintana, 195 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See supra note 20.
83. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 259 (1969).
84. Id. at § 258. Of course, it is not always easy to determine when property was ac-
quired. The question would be one of fact. What constitutes "acquisition" would in all
probability be governed, according to the maxim focus regft actum, by the lex loci celebra-
tionis, or law of the place where the act was carried out.
85. New York courts have adopted a similar choice of law approach on the issue of
community property. Therefore, the Colombian spouse's claim to a community share of de-
cedent's New York bank accounts likely will be governed in New York by Colombian law.
See In re Crichton's Estate, 20 N.Y.2d 124, 228 N.E.2d 799, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967). Of
course, Venezuelan courts will apply their own community property law to any property
located within Venezuela, regardless of where the spouses were domiciled at the time the
property was acquired. See LOMARD, supra note 54, at 42-43.
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erty jurisdiction in which, as a general rule, husband and wife each
own an undivided fifty percent share of property acquired by ei-
ther spouse during marriage or of property that otherwise qualifies
as community property under the applicable rules."' Accordingly,
prior to her separation from decedent, decedent's Colombian
spouse owned an undivided one half share of the couple's commu-
nity property.
2. Effect of Separation
The viability of the Colombian spouse's community property
claim will depend, as a preliminary matter, on her ability to avoid
the preclusive effect of her Colombian separation. Florida courts
will determine the validity and effect of a separation agreement
according to the law of the place of execution. 7 Florida courts also
will give effect to a foreign judicial decree determining the finan-
cial incidents of a divorce, at least when, as here, both parties were
present before the foreign tribunal.8 Consequently, the Colombian
spouse's community property claims will fail unless she can
demonstrate that under Colombian law, her community property
rights survived her separation proceedings with the decedent.
Under Colombian law, her separation from decedent termi-
nated their sociedad conyugal, or marital community. Neverthe-
less, she could still bring an action in Colombia to recover her fifty
percent share in any property that had not been partitioned in
connection with the separation. Therefore, her strategy to over-
come the effect of her Colombian decree will be to argue that the
assets acquired by decedent outside Colombia during their mar-
riage remained community property and must be partitioned. She
must demonstrate that under Colombian law she is entitled to
bring such an action of "additional partition," and must submit
her claim to the Florida court of the situs.
If the Florida court should reject that contention, the only so-
lution for the Colombian spouse is to continue her proceedings in
Colombia to have the property declared community property and
duly partitioned. She then would attempt to enforce the Colom-
bian decree in Florida.
86. See C6D. Civ. arts. 1830, 1832, 1781-1804 (Calom.).
87. See supra note 74.
88. See supra note 78.
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3. Procedural Considerations
(a) Tracing. The Colombian spouse's first objective in Florida
and in Venezuela will be to recover her community property share
of those non-partitioned, community assets owned by decedent
outside Colombia at the date of their separation. Moreover, she
does not have to limit her community property claim to these as-
sets. By virtue of the doctrine of tracing, she may pursue all prop-
erty acquired by decedent after his move to Miami which was pur-
chased with those assets or the proceeds of those assets.
Florida courts have recognized that when property located
within this state is traceable to community assets, such property
will itself be subject to community property claims, with the result
being that the holder of such property will be deemed to hold it as
trustee for the spouse entitled to it.""
(b) Resulting Trust. 0 Under general principles of Florida law,
resulting trust claims lie against all holders of the property of an-
other9 ' with the exception of bona fide purchasers for value, i.e.,
persons who have paid value for the property-and have acquired it
in good faith and without notice of any competing claims to the
assets.,,
(i) Discovery. One factor that makes it particularly appropri-
ate to bring an action based on a resulting trust claim in order to
recover diverted community property is that such an action em-
powers the court to require the putative holders of community as-
sets to explain how and from whom the assets were initially ac-
89. See, e.g., Camara v. Camera, 330 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 3d BCA 1976), cert. denied, 339
So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1976).
90. The nature of the Colombian spouse's resulting trust/conversion claims to recover
her community assets, while they affect decedents probate estate, are not technically pro-
bate claims. Unlike probate claims (such as the Florida spouse's claims to recover assets
under decedents will) which are in rem, the Colombian spouse's claims to recover those
assets under forced heirship rights (the constructive trust/conversion claims to recover a
community share of decedent's property) constitute actions in personam against the holders
of the property sought. The personal nature of the community property claims, as opposed
to the in rem nature of the probate claims, will make an important difference in terms of
the preclusive effect a foreign court would attribute to any decree ultimately rendered.
91. The courts have found a resulting trust, in cases in which property acquired by one
spouse after the marital domicile had been moved out of a community property jurisdiction
to have been acquired with assets derived from property acquired while the marriage domi-
cile was still within the community property jurisdiction. Quintana v. Ordono, 195 So. 2d
577, 580 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). This case should be applicable in the instant context.
92. Pursuant to Florida law, good faith takers for value without notice cannot be bona
fide purchasers for value if they acquire the property from the converter/resulting trustee.
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quired. An action for a resulting trust thus facilitates the tracing of
community assets to which a spouse has been held entitled under
community property principles. e3
(ii) Preliminary Injunction.94 Another advantage of a resulting
trust claim to recoup diverted community property is that prelimi-
nary injunctive relief is available in appropriate cases to prevent
the holder from dissipating the assets. Of course, a temporary in-
junction will be effective only if it is obtained before the holder
learns of the likelihood of suit.
Injunctions are particularly important when cash held in a
bank account is traceable to community assets or is otherwise sub-
ject to foreign claims, as is the case with the funds in the joint
account decedent opened with the estranged brother of his Colom-
bian spouse.9 5 If the defendant should learn of the plaintiff's inten-
tion to sue, he could close out his bank account and leave Florida
with the funds. In that case, the plaintiff would be left with no
recourse other than chasing defendant and suing him personally
wherever he could be found. Moreover, no action would lie against
the bank.9 6 Even if a bank permitted the defendant to withdraw
the funds after the bank was advised of plaintiff's claim, Florida
banking law would insulate the bank from liability unless the bank
had been enjoined by court order.9 7 It is critical, therefore, that a
93. It is well established that a resulting trust claim cannot be defeated by a mere
change in form of the assets involved, e.g., from cash to property or from property to cash.
See, eag-, Brown v. Hanger, S68 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (proceeds of entireties prop-
erty/property of husband and wife). If the Colombian spouse can demonstrate that decedent
sold community assets in Venezuela and used the proceeds to acquire his and his Florida
wife's house in Miami, the court may impose a resulting trust upon the house to the extent
Venezuelan community assets were used to acquire it.
94. The requirements for establishing the right to preliminary injunctive relief are: (a)
the likelihood of irreparable harm, and the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law; (b)
the substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (c that the threatened injury to peti-
tioner outweighs any possible' harm to the respondent, and; (d) that the issuance of the
injunction will not disserve the public interest. Sanchez v. Solomon, 5C So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1987) (preliminary injunction granted freezing joint account opened by Venezuelan
decedent with two of twelve alleged children pending determination of whether Florida or
Venezuelan law governed funds). In ordinary actions at law, injunctive relief or pre-judg-
ment garnishment is extremely difficult to obtain.
95. Assuming that the one million dollars that decedent transferred to his separated
wife's brother is traceable to community assets and that the brother is likely to abscond
with the cash as soon as he learns that his sister has sued to impose a resulting trust upon
those funds, the Colombian wife can obtain a temporary injunction, without prior notice to
her brother, precluding the bank from disbursing the funds pending the ultimate outcome of
the resulting trust claim. See Sanchez, 508 So. 2d at 1264.
96. FLA. STAT. 658.55 (1987).
97. Id.
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plaintiff, such as decedent's Colombian spouse do everything possi-
ble to keep her intentions private until an injunction has issued.
(c) Conversion. If the depository bank that permitted defend-
ant to withdraw alleged community funds prior to the issuance of a
temporary injunction was on notice when it accepted the deposits
that the deposited funds had been converted, the bank itself would
be liable for conversion. Mere negligence by the bank in failing to
discover the converted nature of the fund would not suffice: actual
notice of the conversion must be shown to expose the bank to lia-
bility. If the foreign spouse could show that both defendant ac-
count holder and the bank had actual knowledge of her community
property claims to the $1,000,000 at the time the bank accepted
those funds, the bank would be a converter and as such, liable for
the full amount of the deposit."
4. Interrelationship Among the Proceedings
A practitioner bringing claims on Florida assets based on the
community property laws of Latin America must carefully coordi-
nate the actions to be taken in the various countries. Indeed, in
few other areas of international practice will proceedings be so in-
terdependent. The Colombian spouse in our hypothetical has
demonstrated her awareness of this interdependence by bringing
additional proceedings in Colombia to partition omitted property,
thus attempting to avoid any claim, that pursuant to the separa-
tion decree, all community property claims were barred. Moreover,
courts in the various jurisdictions where community property is lo-
cated are likely to lend weight to a prior foreign decree determin-
ing the community property rights of the claimant spouse as
against the holders of alleged community property, because com-
munity property claims, unlike probate claims, are personal in
9S. The ramifications of a claim for conversion under those circumstances against a
bank are explosive, especially in an international banking community such as Miami. Be-
cause bankers in Miami arguably are on notice of the community property laws of Latin
America, a colorable claim could be made that each time a married Latin American nonresi-
dent deposits money in his own name in a Miami bank account, the bank is on notice that
such funds may be community property. Upon the account holder's transfer of the money to
a Miami mistress, the bank could be held liable for conversion. Obviously, given the poten-
tially enormous liability in such cases and the chilling effect it would have on everyday
financial transactions, such imputed notice would be construed very narrowly. Nonetheless,
if strong indications exist of a bank's complicity with the depositor to divert community
property from the spouse, the possibility of bringing such a claim against the bank should
be considered.
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nature."
When all the parties are before a court in an action to deter-
mine community property rights in specific property, a final decree
from the forum court is likely to be afforded preclusive effect as to
subsequent community property claims in other jurisdictions.'
Alternatively, even if all of the interested parties are not before the
court, principles of international comity might well lead one court
to afford greater weight to the claims of a party who has previously
been successful in establishing or defeating a community property
claim to the decedent's assets in another jurisdiction.Y' In this
case, for example, the ability of the Colombian spouse to convince
a court to issue a preliminary injunction in Florida would be en-
hanced if she could demonstrate that in Colombian proceedings
she had successfully established her community property claim to
specific assets of the decedent.
A spouse who has already established a community property
claim in one forum may also attempt to enforce the judgment in a
second forum based on comity, or may request temporary mea-
sures through international judicial assistance. However, it must be
kept in mind that these remedies are time consuming and certainly
not foolproof. It is prudent, therefore, to pursue a community
property claim in every jurisdiction in which putative community
assets are located.' In our hypothetical, for example, although
United States conflicts principles and section 731.106(t) of the
Florida Probate Code suggest that negotiable commercial paper is
located at the situs of the paper as opposed to where the debtor
resides, the current holder of the paper can always petition a court
in the jurisdiction where the debtor resides and request relief
which, if granted, would bar the remedy sought by the claimant
spouse. The Colombian spouse, then, would be wise to consider
pursuing her community property claim to decedent's commercial
paper and other certificates both in Florida, where the paper is lo-
99. In probate cases, which are considered to be in rem proceedings, a local court will
rarely record a foreign judgment determining the distribution of assets outside the jurisdic-
tion of the rendering court. Resulting trust or conversion claims to recover community prop-
erty, however, are personal actions that may be brought in any jurisdiction where the claim-
ant can obtain personal jurisdiction over the purported holders, and a judgment in such a
case is more likely to be afforded extraterritorial effect.
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 98 (1969).
101. Id.
102. Such multiple actions arguably would not be barred, even though interested par-
ties might raise the issue of Us pendens. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT Op LAWS J
86 (1969)-
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cated, and in the forum where the debtor resides.
C. Inheritance Rights of the Colombian Spouse in Florida
1. Choice of Law Considerations
Under Florida law, succession to a decedent's real estate is to
be determined in accordance with the law of the situsY'°3 Succes-
sion to decedent's personalty, however, is determined by the law of
decedent's last domicile, wherever that .personalty may have been
located at the date of death.3 " Consequently, the validity of dece-
dent's will and the distributuion of decedent's Florida real estate,
as well as his Florida and New York personalty, will be determined
under Florida law.105
2. Applicable Substantive Law: The Florida Elective Share
In Florida, only the surviving spouse can elect against dece-
dent's will.06 The surviving spouse's elective share under Florida
law is thirty percent of decedent's Florida realty and of his per-
sonal property wherever located.1 In our hypothetical, decedent's
Florida spouse, assuming she is found to have that status, would
have no interest in opting to take her elective share, because her
share under the will is greater than what she would take under
Florida's forced heirship provision.
Also, in our hypothetical, decedent left a Florida will specifi-
cally naming his Florida wife as his principal heir and personal
representative. Consequently, a judicial finding in Florida that the
Colombian first wife was the surviving spouse would not disinherit
the Florida second wife, and arguably would not disqualify her
from acting as the estate's personal representative.108 However,
103. See Trotter v. Van Pelt, 144 Fla. 517, 198 So. 215, 217 (1940); Frazier v. Boggs, 37
Fla. 307, 20 So. 245 (1896).
104. See In re Estate of Siegel, 350 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
105. New York has adopted the same choice of law approach as Florida on the issue of
succession to a decedent's personalty. See In re Estate of Clark, 21 N.Y.2d 478, 236 N.E.2d
152, 288 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1968). Thus, a New York court also would apply Florida law to
determine the succession to decedent's New York bank account. Venezuela and Colombia,
on the other hand, in all likelihood would not recognize Florida law as governing the succes-
sion of any property within their borders, be it personalty or realty. See supra note 65.
106. FA. STAT. § 732.201 (1987).
107. Ft, STAT. § 732.207 (1987).
108. Of course, if decedent had died intestate and the Colombian wife were determined
to be the surviving spouse, the Florida wife under the same circuntances would lose any
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such a finding would reduce the Florida spouse's inheritance as a
consequence of the Colombian spouse's right to take thirty percent
of decedent's assets against his will. The first question, therefore, is
whether Florida courts will recognize the Colombian wife as the
surviving spouse for purposes of the elective share provisions of the
Florida Probate Code.
The incidents of decedent's marital relationship with his Co-
lombian spouse likely will be determined by the law of Colombia,
where the parties were married and later separated. "'l Because
under Colombian law the effect of the judicial separation decree
was to sever only their economic bonds, and because decedent
never obtained a divorce in any other jurisdiction, in all likelihood
it would be determined under Florida conflicts rules that the Co-
lombian spouse retained her status as decedent's wife through the
date of death. 10
The validity of decedent's Florida marriage will be deter-
mined according to the law of Florida, the place of celebration.1 1 '
In Florida, marriage by a person already married is bigamous.1 2 A
Columbian separacion de cuerpos does not destroy the marriage
bond.1 1 3 Therefore, when decedent married his Florida wife, he was
still married under Colombian law, and his attempted Florida mar-
riage was bigamous. Under Florida law, a bigamous marriage is
void and invalid.1 14 Therefore, assuming Florida applies Colombian
law to determine decedent's marital relationship with his Colom-
bian wife, the Colombian wife would be deemed decedent's surviv-
ing spouse. Furthermore, if in accordance with traditional conflicts
rules, Florida courts apply forum law to determine the rights of a
surviving spouse to decedent's estate and in particular her right to
claim to the probate assets and any right to serve as personal representative. FLA. STAT. §
733.301(2)(a) (1987).
109. Florida recognizes the general principle that the validity of a marriage is deter-
mined by the law of the place of celebration. Goldman v- Dithrich, 13' Fla. 408, 179 So. 715
(1938); Young v. Viruet de Garcia, 172 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965).
110. Florida law would have permitted a full divorce, once decedent established his
domicile in Florida, notwithstanding the provisions of Colombian law to the contrary. See
Tsilidis v. Pedakis, 132 So. 2d 9 (Fla. lst DCA 1961) (as forum, Florida need not adhere to
nor enforce incidents of a status which are repugnant to local forum's laws or policy).
Whether Colombia would recognize such divorce is doubtful, given the strong public policy
in that country regarding the indissolubility of Catholic marriages. See supra note 8.
111. See supra note 109.
112. See supra note 12.
113. C6D. Crv. art. 167 (Colom.).
114. See Goldman v. Dithrich, 131 Fla. 408, 179 So. 715 (1938). See generally 25 FLA.
Jua. 2d Family Law § 33-37 (1981).
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the elective share, the Colombian spouse would be able to elect to
take thirty percent of decedent's probate assets, in Florida and
New York, against his Florida will.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Colombian wife will be consid-
ered the surviving spouse, her right to take an elective share still
will depend on whether she can avoid any adverse effect of her
separation from decedent under the Colombian law of testate suc-
cession. The question is whether her separation in Colombia termi-
nated her right to claim a forced heirship in Colombia in a case of
testamentary succession.
Under Colombian law, it is clear that the Colombian spouse's
community property rights were terminated by her separation de-
cree. 11e It is clear also that she remains decedent's spouse.1 0 As
regards intestacy, in certain cases, she could claim an intestate
forced heirship in spite of the separation, although not when there
are children. 1 7 With regard to testate succession, a surviving
spouse in Colombia is not entitled to a legitima or legitimate por-
tion, i.e. a true forced heirship,"" her only claim against a will be-
ing be the conjugal portion, generally one quarter of the estate."
Under Colombian law, however, the conjugal portion is incompati-
ble with a community property share, that is, a surviving spouse
must elect between her community property or her conjugal por-
tion.'20 Because the Columbian spouse in this situation already re-
ceived her community property in the course of the separation, it
is likely that she would not be able to claim a conjugal portion or
Colombian elective share in Colombia.' If Florida looks to Colom-
bian law, therefore, arguably she should not be entitled to an elec-
tive share in Florida.
115. See supra note 9.
116. Article 167 of the Colombian Civil Code provides that the separaci6n de cuerpos
does not dissolve the marriage bond, although it suspends cohabitation.
117. See CARRIZOSA PARDO, supra note 45, at 386-87.
118. The only heirs entitled to a legitima under Colombian law are descendants (legiti-
mate, adopted or extramatrimonial, i.e., illegitimate), ascendants, adoptive parents and nat-
ural parents of a child adopted in simple adoption. COn. CIV. art. 1240 (Colom.). The surviv-
ing spouse is protected by the porci6n conyugal.
119. COD, CiV. arte. 1230-1235 (Coloa.). See CABRIZOSA PARDo, supra note 45, at 386-87.
120. See CARRizoaA PARo, supra note 45, at 386-87.
121. See COD. Civ. art. 594 (Colorn.) (when surviving spouse can elect between the por-
ciOn conyugal and a community property share, election must be made before invcntory and
appraisal).
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3. Potential Windfalls
(a) The Double Whammy. If a Florida court does not accept
this consequence of the application of Colombian probate law, the
Colombian spouse might well overcome the effect of her separation
and establish her status as surviving spouse. She then could elect
to take thirty percent of decedent's probate assets in Florida and
New York against his Florida will, This result would be clearly
anomalous.12 - Community property rights in jurisdictions that
have adopted the community property system are designed for
much the same purpose as the surviving spouse's elective share
rights in common law jurisdictions, i.e., to protect a spouse from
total disinheritance by the other. However, neither in common law
nor in civil law jurisdictions are the rights of the surviving spouse
intended totally to bar the rights of the decedent's other heirs or to
eliminate decedent's right freely to dispose of at least part of his or
her property. 23
Further, under Colombian law, in the limited number of cases
in which inheritance rights are available over and above a surviv-
ing spouse's community property, the community property assets
received are set off against those rights."5 4 In Florida, if a decedent
leaves a will disinheriting the spouse, the spouse can take at least
thirty percent of the probate estate as her elective share.2 5 How-
ever, there are no community property rights in Florida.'" If the
Colombian spouse prevails in her contention that the court should
apply traditional choice of law principles pursuant to which the
status of property is determined by the law of the marital domicile
and her inheritance rights are determined by the law of decedent's
last domicile, she will get the windfall protection of both the Co-
lombian community property laws and Florida's forced heirship
122. For a discussion of similarly problematic results on the inheritance of the surviving
spouse when a couple moves from a common law state to a commur ty property state or
from a community property state to a common law state, see Juenger, supra note 30, at
1074-76; Scoles, Estate Planning, supra note 24 at 422; see also Clausnitzer, supra note 30
(discussion of various statutory solutions to the problem, principally in the community
property states of the United States).
123. In fact, a surviving spouse may claim both her community property share and an
elective share in the other's estate in only a few community property jurisdictions. See gen-
erally Clausnitzer, supra note 30.
124. C6n. Crv. art. 1284 (Colom.). See CARRIZOSA PARDO, sUpra note 45, at 380-86.
125. FLa. STAT. § 732.207 (1987).
126. Although Florida is not a community property state, the adoption of the doctrine
of equitable distribution might be construed as a stop in this direction. See Canakaris v.
Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980).
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laws. As a result, she would receive property far exceeding that
which she could claim under Colombian or Florida law alone. 2 7
The Florida Probate Code does contain a provision which can
be relied upon as a basis for restricting the potential for such
double recovery, at least in cases where civil law spouses have fully
settled their community property rights: Section 732.702 of the
Florida Probate Code provides that where a spouse has entered
into a complete property settlement in connection with a separa-
tion, that spouse forfeits any right as an intestate heir in the estate
of the other."1 The statute also provides an analogous forfeiture as
to the elective share.1 29 Accordingly, in certain cases where, as
here, Latin American spouses have separated under a system
where only the economic bonds - not the marriage bonds can be
severed, and where the parties have, in fact, separated their prop-
erty, Section 732.702 should be considered as a possible basis for
defeating a claim for intestacy or elective share rights.
(b) A Bite of What Apple? In addition, the Florida Probate
Code may provide another possible windfall in favor of the Colom-
bian spouse. The Code limits the calculation of the surviving
spouse's elective share in the testate estate of a Florida decedent to
the decedent's Florida realty.13" Real property located outside
Florida is expressly excluded.13 1 However, all decedent's personal
property wherever located is included.132 By entitling a surviving
127. See Scoles supra note 24, at 435.
128. FFA. STAT. § 732.702 provides:
(1) the right of election of a surviving spouse, the rights of the surviving spouse
as intestate successor or as a pretermitted spouse, and the rights of the surviving
spouse to homestead, exempt property, and family allowance, or any of them,
may be waived, wholly or partly, before or after marriage, by a written contract,
agreement, or waiver, signed by the waiving party. Unless it provides to the con-
trary, a waiver of 'all rights,' or equivalent language, in the property or estate of
a present or prospective spouse, or a complete property settlement entered into
after, or in anticipation of, separation, dissolution of marriage, or divorce, is a
waiver of all rights to elective share, intestate share, pretermitted share, home-
stead property, exempt property, and family allowance by each spouse in the
property of the other and a renunciation by each of all benefits that would
otherwise pass to either from the other by intestate succession or by the proui-
sions of any will executed before the waiver or property settlement ...
(emphasis added).
129. Id.
130. FLA. STAT. § 732.206 (1987) provides that "[tlhe elective share shall be computed
by taking into account all property of the decedent wherever located that is subject to ad-
ministration except real property not located in Florida."
131. Id.
132. Id.
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spouse to claim thirty percent of all decedent's personalty wher-
ever located, the legislature apparently presumed that the courts
in other jurisdictions where a Florida decedent's personalty might
be located would simply transfer that property to the Florida pro-
bate court for distribution 5. 3 This may not always be the case.
While the general rule is that distribution of personalty is gov-
erned by the law of decedent's domicile at death, courts in other
jurisdictions might not agree that a given asset is personalty, that
decedent was domiciled in Florida at the date of death, or that an
heir has the status to inherit as such.?' In addition, such jurisdic-
tions may require an ancillary probate proceeding, with the attend-
ant uncertainties of characterization and choice of law. The same
problems, and others, can and do arise in connection with personal
property located outside the United States. Although state courts
in the United States tend to refer distribution of a decedent's per-
sonalty to the probate court in the decedent's domiciliary forum,
this is not necessarily the practice outside the United States. In
addition, Colombia and Venezuela might not recognize a Florida
court's decree transferring decedent's personalty within their bor-
ders to Florida. Also, they may not distribute decedent's personal
property within their borders to the testamentary heirs designated
in decedent's Florida will.
Accordingly, a Florida court might be moved to take the Co-
lombian spouse's entire elective share, an amount equal to thirty
percent of decedent's Florida realty and of his personalty every-
where, entirely out of decedent's Florida probate assets. A gross
injustice would result. 35 Even if the Florida court applied the stat-
utory percentages to the Florida probate assets only (seventy per-
cent to the intended heirs and thirty percent to the Colombian
133. Cf. FL& STAT. § 731.106 (1987) (Florida Probate Code). In the case of a nonresi-
dent decedent leaving assets, tangible or intangible, having a situs within Florida:
(2) The court may, and in the case of a decedent who was at the time of his
death a resident of a foreign country the court shall, direct the personal repre-
sentative appointed in this state to make distribution directly to those desig-
nated by the decedent's will as beneficiaries of the tangible or intangible prop-
erty or to the persons entitled to receive the decedent's personal estate under
the laws of the decedent's domicile, as the case may be.
Id.
134. See ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 9, at 770-74.
135. Under traditional conflicts rules, a similar windfall situation occurs among states
of the United States whenever a couple married and acquired substantial property in a com-
munity property jurisdiction and later moved to a common law jurisdiction prior to dece-
dent's death. See generally Clausnitzer, supra note 30.
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spouse), acting under the assumption that courts in other jurisdic-
tions will divide decedent's personalty located in the forum in like
manner, the intended heirs would receive far less than seventy per-
cent of decedent's total estate overall, given their probable inabil-
ity to obtain those percentages of decedent's personalty in Latin
America." 8
D. The Rights of the Disinherited Colombian Children
Florida does not recognize forced heirship for descendants.
Because Florida law will govern the distribution of decedent's Flor-
ida property, none of that property will pass to decedent's Colom-
bian children by virtue of decedent's disinheriting them in his will.
Of course, they could attempt to claim their legitima against the
will in other jurisdictions, although it is unlikely that a Florida
court would enforce a Colombian judgment purporting to accord
the Colombian children a forced share of Florida real property.
E. Decedent's New York Bank Account
Although in certain cases some jurisdictions have alleviated
the need for ancillary administration of a non-domiciliary's per-
sonal estate within their borders (principally in cases of small an-
cillary estates), New York and Florida have not. Accordingly, it
will be necessary for the Colombian spouse to obtain ancillary let-
ters of administration in New York to obtain title to the money in
decedent's New York bank accounts. Whether she will need to ap-
pear personally in New York to assert her right to an elective share
under Florida law will depend upon whether a New York probate
court will determine the distribution of decedent's personal prop-
erty under New York law, or alternatively, after providing for any
local creditors, merely order that the New York assets be trans-
ferred to the Florida personal representative for distribution under
Florida law. '
Depending upon how the Florida court determines the right
136. See infra note 166.
137. Ancillary letters may be obtained in Florida by a foreign domiciliary personal rep-
resentative provided be or she is qualified to act in Florida. fl.A. STAT. § 74.102(1) (1987).
To qualify in Florida, the nonresident personal representative must be related to the dece-
dent. FLA. STAT. § 733.304 (1987). If the foreign personal representative is not qualified,
those entitled to a majority interest of the Florida property may designate a personal repre-
sentative who is qualified. FLA. STAT. § 734.102 (1987).
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to, and distribution of, the elective share assets, the Colombian
spouse or the Florida spouse may want to assert that the Florida
ruling on distribution of decedent's personalty should be binding
in New York. The rule in Florida is that not only does the law of
the decedent's domicile at death govern distribution of personalty
outside the domiciliary jurisdiction, but further that the domicili-
ary decree is binding on the non-domiciliary proceedings as to
personalty."'
New York choice of law principles clearly provide for the ap-
plication of Florida law to the distribution of decedent's New York
personalty. Therefore, the spouse's right to an elective share will
be determined according to Florida law.139 It is not clear, however,
whether a New York court would consider itself bound by a Flor-
ida probate decree as a matter of res judicata or alternatively
merely would order that decedent's New York monies be trans-
ferred to the Florida personal representative. Thus, it is possible
that the elective share issue, and even the community property
claim, might need to be raised by the spouse in New York with
respect to the New York accounts.
If the Colombian spouse can avoid the effect of her separation,
application of basic conflicts principles in her Florida and New
York proceedings could result in her acquisition of both a fifty per-
cent community property share of a substantial portion of dece-
dent's probate and non-probate assets, and a forced heirship elec-
tive share in an additional thirty percent of decedent's probate
assets in Florida and New York.
V. THE FLORIDA WIFE'S STRATEGY AND DEFENSES
A. Intervention in Latin American Proceedings
The first and perhaps most important strategic decision for
decedent's Florida wife is whether or not she should enter an ap-
pearance in Colombia and Venezuela to contest the Colombian
wife's claims. A critical objective of the Florida wife's defense in
any jurisdiction where decedent possessed property would be to es-
tablish the effect of the Colombian wife's separation from dece-
188. It is not entirely clear from § 734.102 whether a Florida court would itself deter-
mine distribution of the personalty of a nonresident decedent, or instead would transfer the
assets to the domiciliary personal representative for distribution.
139. See ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 9, at 793.
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dent. 4 In this regard, the effect of an appearance by the Florida
spouse in the Colombian proceedings upon her ability to rely on
the extraterritorial effect of the separation decree must be consid-
ered. It is also important to consider the property which she might
forfeit to the Colombian spouse by failing to intervene in the Latin
American proceedings.
1. Intervention in Colombia as It Affects the Florida Spouse's Re-
liance on the Colombian Separation Decree
If the Colombian spouse is unopposed in her efforts in Colom-
bia to obtain a community property share of the Florida property
pursuant to her separation decree on the ground that the property
was community property and was never partitioned, she will prob-
ably obtain a Colombian judgment establishing her community
property claim to a significant portion of decedent's non-Colom-
bian assets. 1 ' However, the problem with intervention from the
Florida spouse's point of view, is that if the Colombian spouse suc-
ceeds in Colombia in the face of opposition by the Florida spouse,
this opposition could lead to the Colombian judgment declaring
additional assets located outside Colombia to be community prop-
erty. Partitioning them would be giving effect in tribunals outside
Colombia.'4
2
If the Florida spouse does not appear in the Colombian pro-
ceeding, she could argue in Florida that any decree rendered in
140. The Florida spouse would wish to make sure that no property of decedent that is
not properly characterized as community property is erroneously partitioned. Her interven-
tion also would serve to underscore in the United States the nature of the Colombian
eeparacei6n de cuerpos and the fact that it constitutes a "complete property settlement" as
that term is used in § 732.702 of the Florida Probate Code.
141. See Foreign Judgments in Florida, supra note 25, at 602-0 (procedure to be fol-
lowed in attempting to enforce such a judgment in Florida). Florida courts have recognized
that the establishment of non-record title interests arising out of community property
claims should be settled in the forum state. See Estabrook v. Wise, 348 So. 2d 355, 357 (Fla.
1st DCA 1977).
142. If the Colombian spouse can convince courts outside Colombia that the Colombian
separation decree by its nature settled her claims only as to property partitioned pursuant
to that decree, she could without more, assert her community forced heirship claims to dece-
dent's property outside Colombia. In any event, the Florida spouse must convince the courts
outside Colombia that the nondisclosure of decedent's foreign assets, at the very most, gives
the Colombian wife the right to bring supplemental partition proceedings in Colombir, and
does not allow her to modify or set aside the decree. The effect of nondisclosure in a liquida-
tion of the marital community pursuant to a Colombian separaci6n de cuerpos is thus en-
tirely different from the effect of a similar nondisclosure by a United States spouse in con-
nection with a marital separation in a common law state.
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that proceeding is not entitled to extraterritorial effect and should
not be enforced outside Colombia. The argument might succeed.143
When determining whether to recognize and enforce a foreign
judgment, Florida courts follow traditional principles of comity.
Pursuant to these principles a foreign judgment or decree will be
recognized in the United States only if the foreign court had per-
sonal jurisdiction over all interested parties and all interested par-
ties actually appeared to litigate the matter. 44
There appears to be no precedent to suggest how a court
would respond to the argument that the non-intervention of the
Florida wife in a community property proceeding in Colombia
should enable her to avoid the effect of a judicial partition of addi-
tional community property. However, there is precedent in support
of the proposition that the Colombian separation decree precludes
Florida courts from entertaining any claim by the Colombian
spouse to decedent's property in Florida.'4 5
In Estabrook v. Wise,'4 the appellate court ruled that it
would do injustice to the doctrine of res judicata for a Florida
court to recognize a spouse's community property claim to Florida
realty in the face of a prior Texas divorce decree severing the par-
ties' community property."'" The court reached this result notwith-
standing the fact that the wife in Estabrook, like the Colombian
spouse here, claimed that the Florida property at issue had not
143. One of the defenses to an action to enforce a foreign judgment in Florida is that
there was no notice or opportunity to be heard. See Foreign Judgments in Florida, supra
note 25, at 610-16. However, the Colombian spouse's additional partition action likely would
be found to be in the nature of an in rem proceeding and the judgment consequently might
be held binding erga omraes. Id. at 613 (discussing Atlantic Ship Supply, Inc. v. MNV Lucy,
892 F. Supp. 179 (M.D. Fla. 1975)).
144. See Foreign Judgments in Florida, supra note 25, at 607; Bishop & Burnette,
supra note 25, at 431-32.
145. See Estabrook v. Wise, 348 So. 2d 355 (Fla. lst DCA 1977). But c.f., Sachias v.
Sachlas, 440 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (in suit by husband to establish resulting trust
in Florida real property standing in wife's name, court saw no reason to leave decision to
Canadian court where couple's divorce action was pending, because Florida law controlled
the issues and Florida expressly conferred personal jurisdiction over defendants in matters
involving ownership of property).
146. 348 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
147. Id. at 357. It should not be fatal to the Florida spouse's reliance upon Estabroak
that the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution does not require Flor-
ida courts to recognize a decree rendered by a court in a foreign country. The modern trend
is for United States courts to treat foreign judgments, for purposes of res jadicata and
collateral estoppel, in the same way as judgments rendered by courts in their sister states.
See SCOLS & lAY, supra note 9, at 920-80. See also Bishop & Burnette, supra note 25, at
440-42.
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been disclosed to her or to the Texas court which entered the de-
cree settling the parties' community claims to each other's prop-
erty. Thus, non-intervention by the Florida spouse might make it
easier for her to argue that a decree declaring additional assets to
be community property should not be enforced outside Colombia,
and especially not in Florida, the state of the situs.', e
On the other hand, by not appearing in Colombia, the Florida
spouse might forfeit any chance to defeat on substantive grounds
the attempt in Colombia to establish that Florida and Venezuelan
assets actually were community property. In summary, she might
gain nothing from her non-intervention strategy, while running the
risk that in spite of her non-appearance, a Florida court might rec-
ognize the Colombian decree as binding with respect to the status
of the property. 49
2. Intervention in Latin America as It Affects the Florida
Spouse's Rights To Decedent's Latin American Assets
A will executed in Florida might not be recognized as valid in
Colombia or Venezuela unless a decree admitting the will to pro-
bate in Florida is presented to the Colombian and Venezuelan
courts.'50 If the Florida spouse fails to introduce the Florida will in
Colombia or Venezuela, or otherwise does not contest the Colom-
bian or Venezuelan proceedings, she might forfeit her claim to any
of decedent's Latin American property under his Florida will. Of
course, both Colombian and Venezuelan intestacy law, applicable
in those jurisdictions if the will were rejected,16' would entitle the
Florida children to take an intestate share of decedent's estate, de-
spite any alleged illegitimacy on the grounds that the Florida mar-
riage was arguably bigamous.152 Nevertheless, the Florida spouse's
148. Even'if the Florida spouse's non intervention in the proceeding prevents the Co-
lombian spouse from urging that the decree be given effect outside Colombia, the latter
certainly can argue that a foreign court should not recognize the initial separation judgment.
It is hornbook conflicts law that comity does not require recognition of a foreign decree
which is demonstrated to have been secured by fraud. Moreover, it might be argued that in
Florida non-disclosure should vitiate the wife's consent to separate, even though Colombian
law provides a remedy for non-disclosure of community assets in this situation. See Foreign
Judgments in Florida, supra note 25, at 618-20.
149. The Florida court might hold the Colombian decree to be in ren and binding on
the entire world.
150. See EDER, supra note 40, at 53-55 (regarding Colombian law); LomBARD, supra
note 54, at 57-59 (regarding Venezuelan law).
151. C6D. CIV. art. 1037 (Colam.); C6o. Civ. art. 807 (Venez.).
152. In Colombia, natural children take the same intestate share as legitimate
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failure to appear in Colombia or Venezuela might result in the en-
tire estate in those countries being adjudicated to the Colombian
spouse and her children.
In determining whether the assets at issue warrant filing an
appearance, counsel for the Florida spouse should research the for-
eign conflicts principles in calculating which assets are "located" in
Latin America. For example, in our hypothetical, decedent's Vene-
zuelan gold certificate was physically located in Miami. Under
Florida conflicts principles, the certificate is negotiable and there-
fore would be considered to have a situs in Florida, not Vene-
zuela.153 One cannot be certain, however, that a Venezuelan court
would reach the same result as to location of the certificate.6 4 Con-
ceivably, the court might go so far as to direct the Venezuelan gov-
ernment to issue new certificates to persons who qualify as heirs
under Venezuelan law. Indeed, when a decedent dies in one juris-
diction holding stock in a corporation located in another, there is
always the potential for such inconsistent results.15 5 In order to
fully protect the client's interest in the stock, the prudent ap-
proach would be to intervene in any existing proceedings, or if
none have been initiated, to seek court rulings as to situs in both
the jurisdiction where the corporation or issuing entity is located
and the jurisdiction in which the certificates are physically present.
A declaratory judgment proceeding might be indicated.
B. The Florida Spouse's Defenses to the Colombian
Spouse's Community Property Claims
In our hypothetical situation, there is a distinct possibility
that the Colombian spouse claiming a community property interest
in Florida and Venezuelan assets would succeed in overcoming a
defense premised upon her separation with the decedent. This,
would have to be defended against the Colombian spouse's com-
munity property claim by a showing that the assets are not com-
munity property.
As a general rule, assets acquired during marriage in a commu-
nity property jurisdiction are subject to the community property
descendents. C6D. Civ. art. 1045 (Colom.). In Venezuela, they take a half share. C6D. Crv. art.
823 (Venez.).
153. FLA. STAT. § 731.106(1) (1987).
154. See C6n. BuaraTe&N., arts. 105-107.
155. See Scoles, Estate Planning, supra note 24, at 433.
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rights of the spouses.5 8 Also, property acquired with community
assets or the proceeds thereof generally becomes community prop-
erty.ar The Colombian spouse's community property claim will at-
tach to property decedent acquired during marriage and all prop-
erty decedent later acquired in Miami with funds earned during
the marriage. " 8
Under Florida conflicts principles, the characterization of the
following property will depend on Colombian law: (1) property
which decedent acquired during the Colombian marriage which
was purchased with money decedent had earned prior to mar-
riage;159 (2) appreciation during marriage of property decedent ac-
quired prior to marriage; 1' ° (3) income earned during marriage
from property acquired prior to the marriage; (4) property dece-
dent acquired during marriage which appreciated in value after
separation and the move to Miami; and (5) income earned after
the separation and move to Miami from property acquired by de-
156. See generally SCOLES & HAY, supra note 9, at 427-34.
157. Id.
168. The general view is that a spouse's community property rights are cut off after the
marital domicile has been moved to a non-community property jurisdiction, at least as re-
gards property acquired after the move which is not traceable back to assets previously
acquired during coverture. See, e.g., Clausnitzer, supra note 30, at 472-73; Juenger, supra
note 30, at 1073-74; Scoles, Nonbarrable Interest, supra note 24, at 165-68. In our case,
then, even assuming that the Colombian spouse can succeed in an action to partition prop-
erty owned by decedent at the time of her separation but which was not then partitioned,
her rights to claim an interest in the property acquired by decedent after his move to Miami
in 1963 will be terminated. There is no precedent to suggest how a court should treat prop-
erty acquired by decedent between the decree in 1960 and his move to Florida in 1963. This
of course would be a question of first impression to be decided under the Colombian law of
community property.
169. The Florida spouse can make a compelling argument that if the Colombian spouse
is entitled to a community share of property acquired after the separation by alleging that
that property was acquired with community funds, then by the same token, property ac-
quired during the marriage with funds earned by decedent before the marriage should be
separate property.
160. The treatment of appreciation and income is a more muddled issue. Where prop-
erty acquired by one spouse while the marital domicile was a community property jurisdic-
tion has generated income or appreciated in value after the marital domicile has moved to a
non-community property state, courts have split fairly equally on the issue. Similar uncer-
tainty could be expected regarding decedent's Venezuelan gold certificate acquired prior to
decedent's marriage but which appreciated in value during the marriage. To the extent the
Florida spouse argues, in order to protect part of the value of the Venezuelan gold certificate
from a community property claim, that all appreciation and income should be treated in the
same manner as the underlying asset, regardless of when accrued, she must be prepared to
live with a consistent application of that rule with regard to appreciation and income earned
by decedent after his separation and move to Miami on property originally acquired during
his Colombian marriage.
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cedent during marriage.
Arguments as to whether the various assets are community
property must be considered carefully. In particular, counsel for
the Florida spouse must be prepared to establish that as many as-
sets in the estate as possible were acquired either prior to de-
cedent's marriage in Colombia or after the date of decedent's sepa-
ration decree and move to Miami.' An expert accountant should
be retained because of the complexities inherent in determining
when the monies used to acquire a given asset were earned, the
extent to which the value of the asset is due to appreciation, and
when the bulk of such appreciation occurred.
C. Defenses Against the Colombian Spouse's Elective Share
Claims
Even if the Florida spouse is not successful in using the sepa-
ration to defeat the Colombian spouse's claim to an elective share
under Florida law, she has several other arguments in her favor.
1. Public Policy
For public policy reasons, courts have recognized exceptions to
the traditional conflicts rule that the law of the place of divorce
applies to property settlements. For example, in numerous cases in
which a party has been divorced in a jurisdiction where remarriage
is barred, courts have upheld the validity of a second marriage in a
different forum where marriage following divorce is permitted."'
An argument could be made by the Florida spouse that for all in-
tents and purposes, the Colombian separation is tantamount to a
divorce barring remarriage, and thus Florida should recognize the
validity of her marriage to decedent.
2. Laches and Estoppel
Florida courts have invoked the equitable doctrines of laches
and estoppel to prevent first wives from assuming that their di-
vorces are valid and remaining silent over the years while their
161. For example, the Florida spouse might be able to demonstrate conclusively that
the Venezuelan gold certificate was inherited by decedent prior to his marriage and that he
earned much of his wealth fteT his .eparatinn and move to Miami.
162. See SCOLES & HAY, eupra note 9, at 427-34.
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spouses remarry, only to assert the invalidity of the divorce years
later when it best suits them financially.'6 3 The Colombian spouse,
although not divorced in the strict sense, has been silent for fifteen
years in the face of decedent's marriage in Florida, and the argu-
ment may be made that she is estopped from claiming a spouse's
elective share in decedent's estate.
3. Assets Not Subject to Elective Share Set-Off
In the event that the Colombian spouse's right to an elective
share is recognized, the Florida spouse must attempt both to re-
duce the number of assets subject to the thirty percent claim and
to offset against the claim, any other property the Colombian
spouse receives from decedent's estate as community property. In
effect, the Florida spouse will base her arguments on the proposi-
tion that to give the Colombian spouse a thirty percent elective
share would be unfair because it would ignore both the Colombian
spouse's successful recovery of community property from dece-
dent's estate and her own potential acquisition, in numerous other
jurisdictions over which the Florida court would have no control, of
much more than thirty percent of decedent's overall estate. 4 Such
a result would frustrate decedent's testamentary intent.
With respect to the first approach, i.e., minimizing the assets
subject to the thirty percent elective share, it must be kept in
mind that the Florida statute requires, in the case of a decedent
domiciled in Florida, that the thirty percent be calculated upon
the decedent's Florida real property and all his personal property
wherever located. 6 5 It will be critical to call the court's attention
to the fact that while the Florida statutory scheme is based on the
assumption that the testamentary heirs will receive their seventy
percent remainder of the estate after subtraction of the spouse's
thirty percent elective share, it is quite probable that in fact dece-
dent's intended heirs will take far less than seventy percent of his
Latin American personalty. The Florida spouse and children will
argue that distribution to the Colombian spouse in Florida should
be made taking into account the distribution of personalty in other
163. See Lanigan v. Lanigan, 78 So- 2d 92 (Fla. 1955).
164. If the Colombian spouse i3 successful in proving outside Florida that certain of the
probate assets are community property, she would take ultimately more than thirty percent
of those probate assets: part as her share of the community property, part as her elective
share of the estate.
195. FLA STAT. § 732.206 (1987).
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jurisdictions, given the legislative intent of the Florida statute that
a decedent's testate heirs receive seventy percent of decedent's to-
tal estate wherever located.'6 6
Another argument in support of minimizing the assets that the
Colombian spouse can claim as her elective share is that the court
should set off against the elective share all property she receives as
her community share of decedent's Florida assets. There is author-
ity in Florida for the proposition that the elective share afforded
the spouse of a Florida decedent should be reduced by the assets
she has taken in other jurisdictions under a will. '6 It should be
argued that the policy underlying these decisions is that calcula-
tion of the spouse's thirty percent elective share in Florida must
take into account the total assets she receives from the estate. If
this is indeed the thrust of the cases, a compelling argument is that
community property acquired in other jurisdictions is analogous to
testamentary inheritance in other jurisdictions and should be set
off against the elective share. 6 8
166. The principle has been recognized that a court should take into account the overall
estate plan in allotting specific property in one jurisdiction to an heir who has (or has not)
received property in another jurisdiction. See, e.g., Griley v. Griley, 43 So. 2d 360, 353 (Fla.
1949) (when making allotment of dower to widow who elects to take against the will, pro-
bate judge should take into account prior benefits received in Canal Zone under same will).
The French doctrine of prelevernent provides that in transnational estates, if French heirs
are legally barred from taking estate property in a foreign jurisdiction so as to maintain the
percentage of the entire estate to which they are entitled under French law, French courts
will grant them enough of the French estate to reestablish their percentage. See Note,
Avoiding Ciul Law Forced Heirship by Stipulating that New York Law Governs, 20 VA. 1
INT'L L. 887, 894; Code civil, art. 726 (France) and Law of July 14, 1819 thereunder; see also
CO5D. Civ. art. 726 (Dora. Rep.): "En los casos de divisoria de una misma sucesi6n entre
coherederos extranjeros y domninicanos, estos retiraran de los bienes situados en la Repilb-
lic una porci6n igual al valor de los bienes situados en pais extranjero, de los cuales es-
tuviesen excluidos por cualquier titulo que fuese." Scoles, Nonbarrable Interests, supra note
24, at 168-69 (because movables are usually transmitted to domicile for distribution, there is
sufficient reason for domicile to measure legal forced share by all movables in estate wher-
ever located).
167. See Griley v. Griley, 43 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1949); Murphy v. Murphy, 125 Fla. 855,
170 So. 856 (1936); Henderson v. Usher, 170 So. 846 (Fla. 1936). See generally ScoLzs &
HAY, supra note 9, at 166-72. Where a spouse takes under a will in the jurisdiction of the
decedent's domicile, the majority of jurisdictions have held that her elective share claims are
barred elsewhere. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 9, at 794.
168. Of course, if the only policy behind the case law is to preclude inconsistent rme-
dies, it will be more difficult to establish the analogy.
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D. The Power of Attorney Transferring Decedent's Florida
Realty to the Coblombian Children
Issues concerning title to real property are determined as a
general rule by the law of the situs.'5e Thus Florida law will govern
the validity of the inter vivos transfers of decedent's Florida real
property to his Colombian children.1 0
Those transfers were carried out by decedent's eldest Colom-
bian son through a power of attorney granted by decedent in Co-
lombia. As regards execution of the deed transferring the property
from decedent to himself and his brothers and sisters, the dece-
dent's son, as attorney-in-fact, will likely have observed the for-
malities of Florida law.17 1 A problem might arise, however, in that
Florida law also requires that powers of attorney used to convey
real property be executed with the formalities required for the
deed itself.1 ' Powers of attorney executed in Latin American
countries are rarely subscribed to by witnesses.'" They generally
are executed as public documents before a civil law notary.'7 ' If
169. See supra note 73.
170. Id.
171. Florida law requires not only the signature by the grantor, but also that said signa-
ture be attested to by two subscribing witnesses- FLA. STAT. § 689.01 (1987).
172. FLA. STAT. § 709.015(2) (1987) (if exercise of power of attorney requires execution
of recordable instrument, power of attorney must be executed and recorded with same for-
malities as required of instrument itself).
173. See, e.g., C6D. Civ. art. 2149 (Colom.) (mandate may be by public or private docu-
ment) and Decree 960 of 1970 (Colom.), art. 29 (COD. Civ., Editorial Temis Libreria 1985,
699) (no witnesses needed for documents executed before notary); C6D. Civ. arts. 1251 (gen-
eral power of attorney must be granted by public document), 733 (public document is one
executed before notary, who acts without witnesses unless (i) required by law, (ii) a party
requests them, or (iii) the notary judges it necessary) (Costa Rica); COD. Civ. arts. 2054, 1743
(document executed before a notary and incorporated into notary's protocclo or registry is
escritura publica or public document) (Ecuador); COD. Civ. art. 134 (Braz.).
174. A notary public in civil law countries is an official whore importance and prestige
generally is far superior to that of the Notary Public in the United States. See generally
BRNUE]LOS SANCHEZ. FROYLAN, DERECHo NOTARIAL 1-59 (1984) [hereinafter BANUsos] (dis-
cussion of the history of Notaries Public from Roman times). The principal difference be-
tween the English notarial system and the "Latin" system lies in the fact that in the latter,
the Notario is an officer of the State and a legal professional, whereas in the former, the
Notary Public is not a civil servant and generally notarizes only signatures. Id. at 56-57.
Florida law defines "civil law notary" as
[A]n official of a foreign country who has an official seal and who is authorized to
make legal or lawful the execution of any document in that jurisdiction, in which
jurisdiction the affixing of his official seal is deemed proof of the execution of the
document or deed in full compliance with the laws of that jurisdiction.
FLA. STAT. § 695.03(8) (1987) (authorizing recording ot documents relating to real property
that have been legalized or authenticated by civil law notaries).
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the power of attorney granted by decedent to his eldest Colombian
son indeed was executed in this matter, the Florida spouse may
argue, on behalf of decedent's estate, that the power is deficient
and all transfers made with it are invalid. Also, because Florida
law requires that a power of attorney used to make a gift expressly
mention that use,17 5 the lack of specific authorization to make a
gift might provide another ground for setting aside the transfer of
decedent's Florida realty. 1 6
The Colombian children may attempt to defeat these argu-
ments by citing the Protocol on Uniformity of Powers of Attorney
Which Are To Be Utilized Abroad (Protocol), to which both the
United States and Colombia are signatories.1 7 Under the Protocol,
a power valid in the contracting state country where executed is
valid in all treaty countries, provided they are executed in con-
formity with the rules of the Protocol. s It is not clear, however,
whether such a treaty would apply to sustain the validity of a
transfer of Florida real property carried out by power of attorney.
It might be argued, in effect, that while Florida must recognize the
general validity of the power of attorney under the treaty, it may
limit its use for purposes of transferring Florida real estate.1 79
Similarly, the Protocol will not be a defense on the issue of the
use of the power to effectuate a gift, because the treaty itself re-
quires that for a power of attorney to be utilized to effectuate a gift
it must expressly so provide.8 0
175. See Hodges v. Surratt, 066 So. 2d 768, 773-74 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Johnson v.
Fraccacreta, 348 So. 2d 570, 572 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)-
176. Florida law also provides that a transfer by an attorney-in-fact is presumptively
invalid if the attorney conveys the property to himself. See Tanner v. Robinson, 411 So. 2d
240, 241 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (citing Hodges v. Surratt, 366 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA
1979) Johnson v. Fraccacreta, 348 So.2d 570 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)). This would not be a
ground for invalidating the transfer in our hypothetical situation because it is dear in this
case, however, that decedent ratified the transfers in question and the Colombian children
can prove it.
177. Protocol on Uniformity of Powers of Attorney Which Are to Be Utilized Abroad,
Oct. 3, 1941, 56 Stat. 1376, 161 U.N.T.S. 229 [hereinafter Protocol].
178. Id. art. V.
179. It should be noted that Florida by statute authorizes the recording of instruments
concerning real property that are acknowledged abroad before a civil law notary. FaA. STAT.
§ 695.03(3). See supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text.
180. Protocol, supra note 177, art. IV (to authorize acts of ownership, special powers of
attorney must specify in concrete terms the nature of the powers conferred). The Colombian
spouse can argue, then, as to the issue of the use of the power of
attrorney to effectuate a gift, and with some support under Florida precedent, that where a
"gift is made for estate purposes, same can be conferred under a general power."
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VI. CONCLUSION
Many questions raised in this article have no ironclad answer,
although state legislatures, and Florida in particular, have begun
to consider potential foreign elements when adopting statutory so-
lutions. 8' The area of transnational wills and estates is thus a field
in which attorneys are called upon to argue local and international
policy, legal theory, sociology and equitable justice, in sum, to be
creative.
The central figure of our hypothetical never divorced his first
wife. Her claim to a community property share of decedent's as-
sets, based on the source doctrine or tracing, would seem to have a
chance of succeeding. Her more imaginative claim to a spouse's
elective share against decedent's Florida will is far more uncertain
to prosper, although it raises fundamental questions at a point
where law, policy and fundamental fairness converge. It is even
more difficult to predict the ultimate outcome of the second Flor-
ida wife's intervention in the Latin American proceedings. She
may be able to secure certain assets, at least for her children, but
will face serious obstacles in light of her awkward marital position.
Whatever final strategy is adopted by the attorney confronted
with such a transnational hall of mirrors, certain analytical ap-
proaches provide a valuable means of ascertaining the position of
the parties. The first step is of course to prepare an inventory of
the assets and to make a preliminary determination of their nature
and status in light of the procedural posture, marital status, na-
tionality and domicile of the parties. Next, possible action to se-
cure assets that may be dissipated must be considered. ' Once any
preliminary protective measures thought to be necessary have been
taken, the analysis of law and policy begins.
The analytical process that must be undertaken is far easier to
chart than to put into practice. The key factors are the law appli-
cable to the status of the parties, the succession, and the assets of
the estate; the probabilities that courts of the various fora would
apply such law; the probabilities that the courts whose rulings are
necessary to an overall result favorable to the client's interests
181. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 733.205 (1987) (providing for probate of will in possessien of
notary entitled to its custody in a foreign state or country; § 695.03(3) (providing for execu-
tion of conveyances of Florida real estate before a civil-law notary); § 734.104(2) (providing
for affidavit in lieu of petition for foreign probate when no petition required as prerequisite
to probate of will in foreign jurisdiction).
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would accept jurisdiction of the case; and finally, the extraterrito-
rial validity of a judgment recovered in a given forum in all juris-
dictions in which execution will be sought. The party who takes
the offensive has greater room to maneuver and greater flexibility
in establishing the parameters of the action and the theory of the
case. Being able to impose a structural framework to bring order
out of apparent chaos constitutes an important advantage in con-
ceptually complex cases of this type."5 2
Until the United States has entered into treaties of private in-
ternational law addressing the numerous vexed questions that
characterize transnational probate, counsel involved in this fasci-
nating but frustrating field would do well to reflect on the conven-
tional wisdom of litigators worldwide: a bad settlement is better
than a good lawsuit.
As of the date of this publication, an appeal is pending in the
Third District Court of Appeal of Florida in the case of In re Es-
tate of Mario Sanchez. On December 39, 1987, the Eleventh Judi-
cial Circuit Court in and for Dade County, Florida, determined
that Venezuelan law and not the Florida law of totten trusts ap-
plied where the decedent took his Venezuelan assets to Florida
before his death and deposited them in trust for two of his four-
teen children. In re Estate of Mario Sanchez, 84-2067 (Dec. 30,
1987).
182. In Brance v. Security Beneficiel Life Insurance Company, 778 F.2d 1158 (11th Cir.
1985), a case against a U.S. insurer in which an Argentine judgment declaring the presump-
tion of death of an Argentine insured was admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Plaintiff beneficiaries relied on a Florida probate decree handed down in reliance on the
Argentine judgment rather than alleging the collateral estoppel effect of the Argentine judg-
ment itself. The Eleventh Circuit indicated that it at least would have considered the issue,
driving home the importance of formulating the issue in proper terms from the beginning.
Id. at 1162 n.15.
[Vol. 19:2
